CVE-2026-42790

highPriorität · verfolgen · 32EPSS 0.003 · 28. PerzentilDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.34% (28th) EPSS
CVSS 8.1 · high
Is it mine?
41 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification. Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com): First, pubkey_cert:validate_names/6 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject commonName. Second, public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3 in lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference hostname. The strict pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https) matcher does not suppress this fallback. The result is that path validation accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify_peer, a trusted CA, SNI, and the canonical strict https hostname matcher. This issue affects OTP from OTP 19.3 before OTP 29.0.1, OTP 28.5.0.1, OTP 27.3.4.12 and OTP 26.2.5.21, corresponding to public_key from 1.4 before 1.21.1, 1.20.3.1, 1.17.1.3 and 1.15.1.7.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

8.1
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 4.9–8.1

v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 2.8 · Auswirkung 5.2
v3.17.4highAV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Nsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.4highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NsecondaryAusnutzbarkeit 2.2 · Auswirkung 5.2
v4.07.6highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.07.6highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary
v4.04.9mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (41)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1719Erlang/OTP: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Umgehen von SicherheitsvorkehrungenDeutsch2026-05-27csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Erlang/OTP ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

  • EEF-CVE-2026-42790nameConstraints DNS bypass via subject CommonName fallback in public_key hostname verification2026-05-27vendor · osvUS

    ## Summary Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public\_key (pubkey\_cert and public\_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification. Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com): First, pubkey\_cert:validate\_names/6 in lib/public\_key/src/pubkey\_cert.erl only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject commonName. Second, public\_key:pkix\_verify\_hostname/3 in lib/public\_key/src/public\_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference hostname. The strict pkix\_verify\_hostname\_match\_fun(https) matcher does not suppress this fallback. The result is that path validation accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify\_peer, a trusted CA, SNI, and the canonical strict https hostname matcher. This issue affects OTP from OTP 19.3 before OTP 29.0.1, OTP 28.5.0.1, OTP 27.3.4.12 and OTP 26.2.5.21, corresponding to public\_key from 1.4 before 1.21.1, 1.20.3.1, 1.17.1.3 and 1.15.1.7. ## Workarounds The verify\_fun option in the ssl application can be used to ensure that TLS connections fail if the end-entity certificate is missing the subjectAltName extension or has no domain name. Do not use a verify\_fun that accepts the name\_not\_permitted error.

06

auch bekannt als (4)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

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veröffentlicht 2026-05-27geändert 2026-10-26
08

Referenzen (28)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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