CVE-2026-40296

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.002 · 13. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.22% (13th) EPSS
CVSS 5.4 · medium
Is it mine?
15 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

PhpSpreadsheet is a pure PHP library for reading and writing spreadsheet files. The HTML writer skips htmlspecialchars escaping when a cell's formatted value differs from the original value. When a cell has a custom number format containing the text placeholder @ along with any additional literal characters (for example ". @", "@ ", or "x@"), the formatter replaces @ with the cell value and adds the extra characters, causing the formatted value to differ from the original and bypassing HTML escaping entirely. An attacker who can control the cell value and number format of an uploaded spreadsheet that is later converted to HTML and displayed to other users can achieve stored cross-site scripting. This issue is fixed in versions 5.7.0, 3.10.5, 2.4.5, 2.1.16, and 1.30.4.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

5.4
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.15.4mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.15.4mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 2.3 · Auswirkung 2.7
v3.15.4mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.15mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (15)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmcPhpSpreadsheet has XSS via number format code with @ text placeholder bypasses htmlspecialchars in HTML writer2026-04-28ghsa · osvUS

    It was discovered that there is a way to bypass HTML escaping in the HTML writer using custom number format codes. ## The Problem In `Writer/Html.php` around line 1592, the code checks if the formatted cell data equals the original data to decide whether to apply `htmlspecialchars()`: ```php if ($cellData === $origData) { $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, ...); } ``` When a cell has a custom number format containing `@` (text placeholder) with any additional literal characters, the formatter replaces `@` with the cell value and adds the extra characters. This makes `$cellData !== $origData`, so `htmlspecialchars()` is **skipped entirely**. Even a single trailing space in the format (`@ `) is enough to bypass the escape. ## Proof of Concept ```php use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Spreadsheet; use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html; use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Cell\DataType; $spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet(); $sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet(); // XSS payload with malicious number format $sheet->setCellValueExplicit('A1', '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>', DataType::TYPE_STRING); $sheet->getStyle('A1')->getNumberFormat()->setFormatCode('. @'); $writer = new Html($spreadsheet); $writer->save('output.html'); ``` The generated HTML contains: ```html <td>. <img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)></td> ``` The XSS payload is **completely unescaped**. ## Tested Bypass Formats | Format Code | Result | Escaped? | |---|---|---| | `General` (default) | Original value | YES (safe) | | `. @` | `. ` + value | **NO (XSS!)** | | `@ ` (trailing space) | value + ` ` | **NO (XSS!)** | | `x@` | `x` + value | **NO (XSS!)** | This was tested with PhpSpreadsheet 4.5.0 and confirmed the XSS executes in the browser. ## Impact Any application that: 1. Accepts uploaded XLSX files from users 2. Converts them to HTML using PhpSpreadsheet's HTML writer 3. Displays the HTML to other users ...is vulnerable to stored XSS. The attacker embeds the payload in a cell value and sets a custom number format in the XLSX file's `xl/styles.xml`. ## Suggested Fix Always apply `htmlspecialchars()` regardless of whether formatting changed the value: ```php // Instead of conditional escaping: $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_SUBSTITUTE, 'UTF-8'); ``` Or escape AFTER formatting, not conditionally based on equality. ## Reporter Keyvan Hardani

06

auch bekannt als (3)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-05-06geändert 2026-10-26
08

Referenzen (4)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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