CVE-2026-39308

### Summary PraisonAI's recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle's internal `manifest.json` before it verifies that the manifest `name` and `version` match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place `../` traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP `400`. This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it. ### Details The bug is caused by the order of operations between the HTTP handler and the registry storage layer. 1. `RegistryServer._handle_publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:370-426` parses `POST /v1/recipes/{name}/{version}`, writes the uploaded `.praison` file to a temporary path, and immediately calls: ```python result = self.registry.publish(tmp_path, force=force) ``` 2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` opens the uploaded tarball, reads `manifest.json`, and trusts the attacker-controlled `name` and `version` fields: ```python name = manifest.get("name") version = manifest.get("version") recipe_dir = self.recipes_path / name / version recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) bundle_name = f"{name}-{version}.praison" dest_path = recipe_dir / bundle_name shutil.copy2(bundle_path, dest_path) ``` 3. Validation helpers already exist in the same file: ```python def _validate_name(name: str) -> bool: def _validate_version(version: str) -> bool: ``` but they are not called before the filesystem write. 4. Only after `publish()` returns does the route compare the manifest values with the URL values: ```python if result["name"] != name or result["version"] != version: self.registry.delete(result["name"], result["version"]) return self._error_response(...) ``` At that point the out-of-root artifact has already been created. The request returns an error, but the write outside the registry root remains on disk. Verified vulnerable behavior: - Request path: `/v1/recipes/safe/1.0.0` - Internal manifest name: `../../outside-dir` - Server response: HTTP `400` - Leftover artifact: `/tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc/outside-dir-1.0.0.praison` This demonstrates that the write occurs before the consistency check and rollback. ### PoC Run the single verification script from the checked-out repository: ```bash cd "/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI" python3 tmp/pocs/poc.py ``` Expected vulnerable output: ```text [+] Publish response status: 400 { "ok": false, "error": "Bundle name/version (../../outside-dir@1.0.0) doesn't match URL (safe@1.0.0)", "code": "error" } [+] Leftover artifact exists: True [+] Artifact under registry root: False [+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - upload was rejected, but an out-of-root artifact was still created. ``` Then verify the artifact manually: ```bash ls -l /tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc/outside-dir-1.0.0.praison find /tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc -maxdepth 2 | sort ``` What the script does internally: 1. Starts a local PraisonAI recipe registry server. 2. Builds a malicious `.praison` bundle whose internal `manifest.json` contains `name = ../../outside-dir`. 3. Uploads that bundle to the apparently safe route `/v1/recipes/safe/1.0.0`. 4. Receives the expected `400` mismatch error. 5. Confirms that `outside-dir-1.0.0.praison` was still written outside the configured registry directory. ### Impact This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe registry publish flow. Impacted parties: - Registry operators running the PraisonAI recipe registry service. - Any deployment that allows remote recipe publication. - Any environment where adjacent writable filesystem locations contain sensitive application data, service files, or staged content that could be overwritten or planted. Security impact: - Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the registry root. - Availability impact is possible if the attacker targets adjacent runtime or application files. - The issue can be chained with other local loading or deployment behaviors if nearby files are later consumed by another component. ### Remediation 1. Validate `manifest.json` `name` and `version` before any path join or filesystem write. Reject path separators, `..`, absolute paths, and any value that fails the existing `_validate_name()` / `_validate_version()` checks. 2. Resolve the final destination path and enforce that it remains under the configured registry root before calling `mkdir()` or `copy2()`. For example, compare the resolved destination against `self.recipes_path.resolve()`. 3. Move the URL-to-manifest consistency check ahead of `self.registry.publish(...)`, or refactor `publish()` so it receives already-validated route parameters instead of trusting attacker-controlled manifest values for storage paths.

### Summary PraisonAI's recipe registry publish endpoint writes uploaded recipe bundles to a filesystem path derived from the bundle's internal `manifest.json` before it verifies that the manifest `name` and `version` match the HTTP route. A malicious publisher can place `../` traversal sequences in the bundle manifest and cause the registry server to create files outside the configured registry root even though the request is ultimately rejected with HTTP `400`. This is an arbitrary file write / path traversal issue on the registry host. It affects deployments that expose the recipe registry publish flow. If the registry is intentionally run without a token, any network client that can reach the service can trigger it. If a token is configured, any user with publish access can still exploit it. ### Details The bug is caused by the order of operations between the HTTP handler and the registry storage layer. 1. `RegistryServer._handle_publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/server.py:370-426` parses `POST /v1/recipes/{name}/{version}`, writes the uploaded `.praison` file to a temporary path, and immediately calls: ```python result = self.registry.publish(tmp_path, force=force) ``` 2. `LocalRegistry.publish()` in `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/registry.py:214-287` opens the uploaded tarball, reads `manifest.json`, and trusts the attacker-controlled `name` and `version` fields: ```python name = manifest.get("name") version = manifest.get("version") recipe_dir = self.recipes_path / name / version recipe_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) bundle_name = f"{name}-{version}.praison" dest_path = recipe_dir / bundle_name shutil.copy2(bundle_path, dest_path) ``` 3. Validation helpers already exist in the same file: ```python def _validate_name(name: str) -> bool: def _validate_version(version: str) -> bool: ``` but they are not called before the filesystem write. 4. Only after `publish()` returns does the route compare the manifest values with the URL values: ```python if result["name"] != name or result["version"] != version: self.registry.delete(result["name"], result["version"]) return self._error_response(...) ``` At that point the out-of-root artifact has already been created. The request returns an error, but the write outside the registry root remains on disk. Verified vulnerable behavior: - Request path: `/v1/recipes/safe/1.0.0` - Internal manifest name: `../../outside-dir` - Server response: HTTP `400` - Leftover artifact: `/tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc/outside-dir-1.0.0.praison` This demonstrates that the write occurs before the consistency check and rollback. ### PoC Run the single verification script from the checked-out repository: ```bash cd "/Users/r1zzg0d/Documents/CVE hunting/targets/PraisonAI" python3 tmp/pocs/poc.py ``` Expected vulnerable output: ```text [+] Publish response status: 400 { "ok": false, "error": "Bundle name/version (../../outside-dir@1.0.0) doesn't match URL (safe@1.0.0)", "code": "error" } [+] Leftover artifact exists: True [+] Artifact under registry root: False [+] RESULT: VULNERABLE - upload was rejected, but an out-of-root artifact was still created. ``` Then verify the artifact manually: ```bash ls -l /tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc/outside-dir-1.0.0.praison find /tmp/praisonai-publish-traversal-poc -maxdepth 2 | sort ``` What the script does internally: 1. Starts a local PraisonAI recipe registry server. 2. Builds a malicious `.praison` bundle whose internal `manifest.json` contains `name = ../../outside-dir`. 3. Uploads that bundle to the apparently safe route `/v1/recipes/safe/1.0.0`. 4. Receives the expected `400` mismatch error. 5. Confirms that `outside-dir-1.0.0.praison` was still written outside the configured registry directory. ### Impact This is a path traversal / arbitrary file write vulnerability in the recipe registry publish flow. Impacted parties: - Registry operators running the PraisonAI recipe registry service. - Any deployment that allows remote recipe publication. - Any environment where adjacent writable filesystem locations contain sensitive application data, service files, or staged content that could be overwritten or planted. Security impact: - Integrity impact is high because an attacker can create or overwrite files outside the registry root. - Availability impact is possible if the attacker targets adjacent runtime or application files. - The issue can be chained with other local loading or deployment behaviors if nearby files are later consumed by another component. ### Remediation 1. Validate `manifest.json` `name` and `version` before any path join or filesystem write. Reject path separators, `..`, absolute paths, and any value that fails the existing `_validate_name()` / `_validate_version()` checks. 2. Resolve the final destination path and enforce that it remains under the configured registry root before calling `mkdir()` or `copy2()`. For example, compare the resolved destination against `self.recipes_path.resolve()`. 3. Move the URL-to-manifest consistency check ahead of `self.registry.publish(...)`, or refactor `publish()` so it receives already-validated route parameters instead of trusting attacker-controlled manifest values for storage paths.