CVE-2026-33045

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 22EPSS 0.002 · 11. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.21% (11th) EPSS
CVSS 5.4 · medium
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Starting in version 2025.02 and prior to version 2026.01 the "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable cross-site scripting, similar to CVE-2025-62172. Version 2026.01 fixes the issue.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

7.3
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 5.4–7.3

v3.15.4mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 2.3 · Auswirkung 2.7
v4.07.3highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:Psecondary · ENISA EU
v4.07.3highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.05.8mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-46j8-vpx8-6p72Home Assistant has stored XSS in history-graphs2026-03-27ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary The "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable to the same issue as CVE-2025-62172. <img width="431" height="334" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84e0dfad-b986-4e84-ad0e-674c5da88582" /> This also indicates that any sensor showing their name in the history-graph, is likely to be vulnerable to this issue. ### Details Another entity was found which displays the same behavior as in this issue: [CVE-2025-62172](https://github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m) The History-graph card will sometimes display the name of the entity it is displaying, when the graph is shown as a line with values on the x and y axis. This appears to be vulnerable to Cross-Site scripting (_XSS_) as it does not have any output escaping or sanitization. The PoC in this instance only shows HTML-injection in the form of the `<s>` -tag being rendered as strike through, but the vulnerability also allows for injecting arbitrary tags which execute JavaScript, like the example given in the PoC description below. ### PoC 1. Register a new sensor (or device) or change the name of an existing one, which provides a location 2. Change the name to something malicious, for example `test <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain) />` For a new entity, it should work when setting the name. For old entities, go here: <img width="1300" height="411" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7dbd9afa-2f4b-4d03-9384-d57c53eaff5c" /> <img width="1383" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c4cfba2e-e2d8-4817-92fe-f17ba7877e27" /> <img width="387" height="436" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c40e986d-20ca-416e-bcdb-ca1d3afa77a4" /> <br> <img width="392" height="515" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/623fcf8c-eef1-4b17-853d-0ff5440aecaa" /> **PS: the example pictures show changing the name of the device-tracker entity, which is wrong. Just change the name of the `remaining charge time`-sensor in order to validate this finding** 3. Add a history graph card with the malicious sensor <img width="696" height="474" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3cda78e6-3db5-4075-8924-ab9fc5759082" /> 5. Hover the graph for payload execution <img width="343" height="196" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/99e56169-b06a-4c60-9343-510e5d74af12" /> ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability is that a user can target other users of the system and perform account takeover through client side exploitation of XSS. In the context of this system, I believe the vulnerability to be less impactful than the CVSS metric describes. It is not displayed anywhere by default, it is not natural to display this history graph, and it also has no potential for being imported through seemingly innocent integrations. It also appears to rely on having used/using Android Auto. Other devices which has the same sensor can trigger the same vulnerability, and I expect there to exists cloud-based devices that would enable a threat actor to deliver the payload remotely. Credit: Robin Lunde - [https://robinlunde.com](https://robinlunde.com)

  • PYSEC-2026-2516Home Assistant has stored XSS in history-graphs2026-07-13vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary The "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable to the same issue as CVE-2025-62172. <img width="431" height="334" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84e0dfad-b986-4e84-ad0e-674c5da88582" /> This also indicates that any sensor showing their name in the history-graph, is likely to be vulnerable to this issue. ### Details Another entity was found which displays the same behavior as in this issue: [CVE-2025-62172](https://github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m) The History-graph card will sometimes display the name of the entity it is displaying, when the graph is shown as a line with values on the x and y axis. This appears to be vulnerable to Cross-Site scripting (_XSS_) as it does not have any output escaping or sanitization. The PoC in this instance only shows HTML-injection in the form of the `<s>` -tag being rendered as strike through, but the vulnerability also allows for injecting arbitrary tags which execute JavaScript, like the example given in the PoC description below. ### PoC 1. Register a new sensor (or device) or change the name of an existing one, which provides a location 2. Change the name to something malicious, for example `test <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain) />` For a new entity, it should work when setting the name. For old entities, go here: <img width="1300" height="411" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7dbd9afa-2f4b-4d03-9384-d57c53eaff5c" /> <img width="1383" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c4cfba2e-e2d8-4817-92fe-f17ba7877e27" /> <img width="387" height="436" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c40e986d-20ca-416e-bcdb-ca1d3afa77a4" /> <br> <img width="392" height="515" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/623fcf8c-eef1-4b17-853d-0ff5440aecaa" /> **PS: the example pictures show changing the name of the device-tracker entity, which is wrong. Just change the name of the `remaining charge time`-sensor in order to validate this finding** 3. Add a history graph card with the malicious sensor <img width="696" height="474" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3cda78e6-3db5-4075-8924-ab9fc5759082" /> 5. Hover the graph for payload execution <img width="343" height="196" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/99e56169-b06a-4c60-9343-510e5d74af12" /> ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability is that a user can target other users of the system and perform account takeover through client side exploitation of XSS. In the context of this system, I believe the vulnerability to be less impactful than the CVSS metric describes. It is not displayed anywhere by default, it is not natural to display this history graph, and it also has no potential for being imported through seemingly innocent integrations. It also appears to rely on having used/using Android Auto. Other devices which has the same sensor can trigger the same vulnerability, and I expect there to exists cloud-based devices that would enable a threat actor to deliver the payload remotely. Credit: Robin Lunde - [https://robinlunde.com](https://robinlunde.com)

06

auch bekannt als (6)

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07

quellen

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veröffentlicht 2026-03-27geändert 2026-10-26
08

Referenzen (8)

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