CVE-2026-113654

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.003 · 28. PerzentilUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.35% (28th) EPSS
CVSS 5.3 · medium
Is it mine?
1 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-28

ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system, and sanitize-html provides a simple HTML sanitizer with a clear API. Prior to sanitize-html 2.18.0, a non-default nonTextTags configuration that includes noscript can end its discard region early when htmlparser2 emits an implied ancestor close inside noscript. Because scripting-enabled browsers treat noscript content as raw text while the parser does not model that mode, content intended to remain inert can survive sanitization and render; the issue does not generalize to every default nonTextTags element. This issue is fixed in sanitize-html 2.18.0.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

5.3
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–medium · 1.3–5.3

v4.05.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.01.3lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (1)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-x3q4-9hxx-gx8mApostropheCMS sanitize-html: nonTextTags discard region ends early on an implied close, letting <noscript> content render2026-10-20ghsa · osvUS

    ## Summary `sanitize-html` discards the *content* of every element in `nonTextTags`. It delimits that region using htmlparser2's close events, and ignores the `isImplied` flag htmlparser2 passes it. Closing a still-open **ancestor** from inside a `<noscript>` makes htmlparser2 unwind its stack past the `noscript`; the synthetic implied close it emits on the way ends the discard region early, and everything after it is treated as ordinary body content. A browser with scripting enabled parses `<noscript>` content as **raw text**, so the same markup renders as inert text there. The sanitizer therefore emits elements the page itself would not have. ## Reproduction ```js const sanitizeHtml = require("sanitize-html"); sanitizeHtml('<div><noscript></div><img src="http://evil.test/t.gif"></noscript>', { allowedTags: ["div", "img"], allowedAttributes: { img: ["src"] }, nonTextTags: ["script", "style", "textarea", "option", "noscript"], }); // => '<div></div><img src="http://evil.test/t.gif" />' ``` Chrome, given the same input, renders **no** `<img>` — the whole payload is raw text inside the unclosed `<noscript>`. Verified with Playwright, `srcdoc` into an iframe so the scripting flag is on. A `<![CDATA[` variant hides the opening tag from the parser entirely and has the same effect: ``` <p>Hi</p><![CDATA[ x > <noscript>]]><a href="…">Reset your password</a><img src="…beacon.gif"></noscript> ``` htmlparser2 runs a CDATA token to `]]>`; Chrome ends a bogus comment at the first `>`, so the `<noscript>` after it is real to the browser and invisible to the parser. ## Where the behaviour is `index.js`: - `:154` — `nonTextTagsArray` (the default list, `['script','style','textarea','option','xmp']`). - `:638` — `onclosetag: function (name, isImplied)` — receives the flag. - `:644` — `skipTextDepth--` — decrements without consulting `isImplied`. ## Suggested fix Do not end a discard region on an implied close. htmlparser2 already distinguishes them; the flag is passed and discarded. Something close to: ```js onclosetag: function (name, isImplied) { if (skipText) { if (isImplied) return; // an implied close must not end the region skipTextDepth--; … ```

06

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2026-10-20geändert 2026-10-28
07

Referenzen (4) nvd

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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