CVE-2026-112880

## Summary Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in `hackney_http_connect` in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a `proxy_auth_fun` callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller's `proxy_auth_fun` with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the `Proxy-Authorization` line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0. ## Details **1. Challenge.** `hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9` in `src/hackney_http_connect.erl` sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the `proxy_auth_fun` option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11`. **2. Callback result.** `handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller's `proxy_auth_fun` with those two values. On `{ok, AuthHeader}` it removes any existing `Proxy-Authorization` header and appends the binary `<<"Proxy-Authorization: ", AuthHeader/binary>>` to the header list, then retries the handshake with it. **3. Splitting.** The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside `AuthHeader` therefore ends the `Proxy-Authorization` line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same `has_ctl_bytes/1` check to it and returns `{error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}`. ## Impact A party who controls what the application's `proxy_auth_fun` returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy. ## Workarounds Check the value your `proxy_auth_fun` is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return `{error, Reason}` instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there. ## Configurations The client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the `proxy_auth_fun` option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy's 407 challenge headers. Deployments without `proxy_auth_fun`, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected.