CVE-2026-102281

| Field | Value | | --- | --- | | Ecosystem | npm | | Package | `@nestjs/microservices` | | Affected versions | `>= 12.0.0, < 12.0.2` and `< 11.2.4` | | Patched versions | `12.0.2` and `11.2.4` (upgrade to `12.0.3` / `11.2.5`) | ### Summary A single message whose `pattern` is a deeply nested object terminates a NestJS microservice that uses the TCP or RabbitMQ transport. The server serialized the client-supplied pattern with `JSON.stringify` to derive the handler lookup key; on deeply nested input this throws `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`. The exception escaped the asynchronous message handler as an unhandled promise rejection, which terminates the Node.js process under the default `--unhandled-rejections=throw`. ### Impact Denial of service, one message per crash, repeatable. The attacker needs to be able to reach the transport: connect to the TCP transport's port, or publish to the queue or exchange the service consumes from. The TCP transport performs no authentication by default, so on a reachable port this requires nothing else. Only the **TCP** and **RabbitMQ** transports are affected. The other transports take the pattern as a string from the broker topic or channel and never serialize a client-supplied object to build it. ### Details In `ServerTCP#handleMessage` and `ServerRMQ#handleMessage` the pattern was stringified without a guard: ```ts const pattern = isString(packet.pattern) ? packet.pattern : JSON.stringify(packet.pattern); ``` `JSON.parse` accepts nesting depths that `JSON.stringify` cannot re-serialize, because `JSON.stringify` recurses natively, so an attacker can craft a payload that parses successfully on arrival and then throws when the pattern is converted back to a string. Neither transport attached a rejection handler to the promise returned by `handleMessage`, so the `RangeError` propagated out as an unhandled rejection. ### Proof of concept Against a NestJS microservice on the TCP transport (default port 3001). The nested JSON is built as text rather than with `JSON.stringify`, which is what makes the payload serializable by the attacker but not by the victim: ```js const { connect } = require('node:net'); const DEPTH = 100_000; const pattern = '{"nested":'.repeat(DEPTH) + '{}' + '}'.repeat(DEPTH); const payload = `{"pattern":${pattern},"data":null,"id":"1"}`; const socket = connect(3001, '127.0.0.1', () => { // Nest's TCP framing is <byteLength>#<json> socket.write(`${Buffer.byteLength(payload)}#${payload}`); }); ``` The service exits with `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`. The equivalent payload published to the consumed queue crashes a RabbitMQ-transport service. ### Patches Fixed in **12.0.2** and **11.2.4**. - Incoming patterns are converted through a guarded `Server#getPatternAsString`, which falls back to a sentinel value that matches no handler. Such a message now receives the ordinary "no message handler" response (TCP) or is negatively acknowledged (RabbitMQ) instead of crashing the process. - Rejections escaping `handleMessage` in both transports are routed to `handleError` rather than left unhandled. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, restrict network access to the transport so that only trusted peers can reach it. Running the process with `--unhandled-rejections=warn` prevents the crash but leaves the message unprocessed and is not a substitute for the fix. ### Credit Reported by ZeroVuln Labs.