CVE-2025-67644

# Context A SQL injection vulnerability exists in LangGraph's SQLite checkpoint implementation that allows attackers to manipulate SQL queries through metadata filter keys. This affects applications that accept **untrusted metadata filter keys** (not just filter values) in checkpoint search operations. # Impact Attackers who control metadata filter keys can execute arbitrary sql queries against the database. # Root Cause The `_metadata_predicate()` function constructs SQL queries by interpolating filter keys directly into f-strings without validation: ```python # VULNERABLE CODE (before fix) for query_key, query_value in metadata_filter.items(): operator, param_value = _where_value(query_value) predicates.append( f"json_extract(CAST(metadata AS TEXT), '$.{query_key}') {operator}" ) param_values.append(param_value) ``` While filter **values** are parameterized, filter **keys** are not validated, allowing SQL injection. # Attack Example **Before Fix:** ```python from langgraph.checkpoint.sqlite import SqliteSaver saver = SqliteSaver.from_conn_string("checkpoints.db") # Attacker controls the filter keys malicious_filter = {"x') OR '1'='1": "dummy"} # Returns ALL checkpoints, bypassing filtering results = list(saver.list(None, filter=malicious_filter)) ``` **Resulting SQL:** ```sql WHERE json_extract(CAST(metadata AS TEXT), '$.x') OR '1'='1') = ? -- Injected condition makes WHERE clause always true ``` ## Who Is Affected? ### LangSmith Deployment Customers: NOT Impacted **LangSmith deployment customers are NOT affected by this vulnerability.** LangSmith deployments do not allow configuring custom checkpointers, so the vulnerable code path cannot be reached. ### High Risk: Custom Server Deployments You are affected if your application: - Runs a custom server with SqliteSaver checkpointer - Exposes an endpoint for fetching checkpoint history (e.g., via `get_state_history()`) - Accepts metadata filter keys from untrusted sources **Example vulnerable code:** ```python # Custom server endpoint - User controls filter key names - DANGEROUS @app.post("/api/history") def get_history(request): filter_field = request.json.get("filter_field") # Untrusted input filter_value = request.json.get("filter_value") # VULNERABLE: Attacker can bypass access controls history = list(graph.get_state_history( config, filter={filter_field: filter_value} )) return history ``` **Note on privilege escalation:** If an endpoint allows end users to specify arbitrary filter keys, those users likely already have legitimate access to query the checkpoint database. In such cases, this vulnerability may not constitute a privilege escalation, as users who can control filter keys would typically already be expected to have database access. However, the SQL injection still allows bypassing intended filtering logic and metadata-based access controls that the application may rely on for data isolation. ### Additional Security Hardening (Defense in Depth) This release also includes hardening improvements: **1. Checkpoint Limit Parameter**: used f-string interpolation into parameterized query. Not considered a vulnerability as it requires users to accept untrusted input and not validate it against the actual API signature. **2. Store Filter Value Parameterization**: Refactored all filter value handling from manual quote escaping to parameterized queries ## Remediation ### Immediate Actions 1. **Update to the patched version** of `langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite` 2. **Audit your code** for locations where filter keys come from untrusted sources

# Context A SQL injection vulnerability exists in LangGraph's SQLite checkpoint implementation that allows attackers to manipulate SQL queries through metadata filter keys. This affects applications that accept **untrusted metadata filter keys** (not just filter values) in checkpoint search operations. # Impact Attackers who control metadata filter keys can execute arbitrary sql queries against the database. # Root Cause The `_metadata_predicate()` function constructs SQL queries by interpolating filter keys directly into f-strings without validation: ```python # VULNERABLE CODE (before fix) for query_key, query_value in metadata_filter.items(): operator, param_value = _where_value(query_value) predicates.append( f"json_extract(CAST(metadata AS TEXT), '$.{query_key}') {operator}" ) param_values.append(param_value) ``` While filter **values** are parameterized, filter **keys** are not validated, allowing SQL injection. # Attack Example **Before Fix:** ```python from langgraph.checkpoint.sqlite import SqliteSaver saver = SqliteSaver.from_conn_string("checkpoints.db") # Attacker controls the filter keys malicious_filter = {"x') OR '1'='1": "dummy"} # Returns ALL checkpoints, bypassing filtering results = list(saver.list(None, filter=malicious_filter)) ``` **Resulting SQL:** ```sql WHERE json_extract(CAST(metadata AS TEXT), '$.x') OR '1'='1') = ? -- Injected condition makes WHERE clause always true ``` ## Who Is Affected? ### LangSmith Deployment Customers: NOT Impacted **LangSmith deployment customers are NOT affected by this vulnerability.** LangSmith deployments do not allow configuring custom checkpointers, so the vulnerable code path cannot be reached. ### High Risk: Custom Server Deployments You are affected if your application: - Runs a custom server with SqliteSaver checkpointer - Exposes an endpoint for fetching checkpoint history (e.g., via `get_state_history()`) - Accepts metadata filter keys from untrusted sources **Example vulnerable code:** ```python # Custom server endpoint - User controls filter key names - DANGEROUS @app.post("/api/history") def get_history(request): filter_field = request.json.get("filter_field") # Untrusted input filter_value = request.json.get("filter_value") # VULNERABLE: Attacker can bypass access controls history = list(graph.get_state_history( config, filter={filter_field: filter_value} )) return history ``` **Note on privilege escalation:** If an endpoint allows end users to specify arbitrary filter keys, those users likely already have legitimate access to query the checkpoint database. In such cases, this vulnerability may not constitute a privilege escalation, as users who can control filter keys would typically already be expected to have database access. However, the SQL injection still allows bypassing intended filtering logic and metadata-based access controls that the application may rely on for data isolation. ### Additional Security Hardening (Defense in Depth) This release also includes hardening improvements: **1. Checkpoint Limit Parameter**: used f-string interpolation into parameterized query. Not considered a vulnerability as it requires users to accept untrusted input and not validate it against the actual API signature. **2. Store Filter Value Parameterization**: Refactored all filter value handling from manual quote escaping to parameterized queries ## Remediation ### Immediate Actions 1. **Update to the patched version** of `langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite` 2. **Audit your code** for locations where filter keys come from untrusted sources