CVE-2025-64181

highPriorität · verfolgen · 30EPSS 0.004 · 35. PerzentilEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.41% (35th) EPSS
CVSS 7.5 · high
Is it mine?
9 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In versions 3.3.0 through 3.3.5 and 3.4.0 through 3.4.2, while fuzzing `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer`, Valgrind reports a conditional branch depending on uninitialized data inside `generic_unpack`. This indicates a use of uninitialized memory. The issue can result in undefined behavior and/or a potential crash/denial of service. Versions 3.3.6 and 3.4.3 fix the issue.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

7.5
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–high · 1.2–7.5

v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 3.6
v3.17.5highAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.5highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v4.02lowCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:Psecondary · ENISA EU
v4.02lowCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.01.2lowCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (9)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-3h9h-qfvw-98hqOpenEXR Makes Use of Uninitialized Memory2026-04-06ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary While fuzzing `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer`, Valgrind reports a conditional branch depending on uninitialized data inside `generic_unpack`. This indicates a use of uninitialized memory (CWE-457). The issue is reproducible with the current OSS-Fuzz harness and a single-file PoC. ### Details **Environment:** - Tooling: `valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes` - Target: `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer` - OS: Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS focal x86_64 - openexr version and Git-commit hash: ` openexr 3.4.2 | commit fd657e8a41e157e5841c7cc2e2a5efe094b069a1 (grafted, HEAD -> main, origin/main, origin/HEAD)` Function: `generic_unpack` Possible root cause (based on observed symptoms): The unpacker is branching on bytes in a scratch buffer that were never written because the decode step didn’t fully populate it. - The first use flagged is in `generic_unpack()`. That function reads from the decompressed/expanded pixel buffer to scatter data into the framebuffer. A “conditional jump depends on uninitialised value(s)” means it’s consulting bytes in that buffer before they were written. - Valgrind says the uninitialised value “was created by a heap allocation (malloc)”, not the stack: this matches a per-tile/per-scanline decode scratch buffer allocated in `exr_decoding_run()`. **Valgrind Trace (top frames):** ```bash ==454== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) ==454== at 0x4539BE: generic_unpack (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x44B85F: exr_decoding_run (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x38BC5F: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::TileProcess::run_decode(_priv_exr_context_t const*, int, Imf_4_0::FrameBuffer const*, std::__1::vector<Imf_4_0::Slice, std::__1::allocator<Imf_4_0::Slice> > const&) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x388BE1: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::Data::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x388619: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x353755: Imf_4_0::InputFile::Data::bufferedReadPixels(int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x352286: Imf_4_0::InputFile::readPixels(int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x3190FA: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::readMultiPart(Imf_4_0::MultiPartInputFile&, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x314C4D: Imf_4_0::checkOpenEXRFile(char const*, unsigned long, bool, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation at 0x483B7F3: malloc (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ``` ### PoC In the attached archive, you will find: - The executable used for our tests. - The testcase used to trigger the bug. To observe the bug, simply run the OSS-Fuzz helper script: ```bash git clone https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz.git cd oss-fuzz python3 infra/helper.py build_image openexr python3 infra/helper.py build_fuzzers --sanitizer=none openexr python3 infra/helper.py shell openexr apt update && apt install -y valgrind ulimit -n 65535 valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer /path/to/poc ``` ### Impact - Undefined Behavior - Potential crash - Denial of Service **Credit:** Aldo Ristori [archive0.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024726/archive0.zip) ### Update Note: Other saved testcases from the fuzzing campaign trigger the same underlying bug, but with a different manifestation. So there is one root cause (missing post-decode validation / zero-init before any unpack), with different call-sites. Below there are several archives, formatted like the previous one, that reproduce the other test cases. **Other observed sinks (distinct manifestations of the same bug):** **Deep pointers path:** generic_unpack_deep_pointers (deep scanline/tiled) [archive1.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024736/archive1.zip) **Deep sample table path:** unpack_sample_table (deep scanline) [archive2.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024740/archive2.zip) **Half conversion path:** half_to_float_buffer_f16c via unpack_half_to_float_3chan_planar [archive3.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024744/archive3.zip) **Deep compositing:** CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels → ThreadPool::addTask → LineCompositeTask::execute [archive4.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024746/archive4.zip)

  • PYSEC-2026-2843OpenEXR Makes Use of Uninitialized Memory2026-07-13vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary While fuzzing `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer`, Valgrind reports a conditional branch depending on uninitialized data inside `generic_unpack`. This indicates a use of uninitialized memory (CWE-457). The issue is reproducible with the current OSS-Fuzz harness and a single-file PoC. ### Details **Environment:** - Tooling: `valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes` - Target: `openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer` - OS: Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS focal x86_64 - openexr version and Git-commit hash: ` openexr 3.4.2 | commit fd657e8a41e157e5841c7cc2e2a5efe094b069a1 (grafted, HEAD -> main, origin/main, origin/HEAD)` Function: `generic_unpack` Possible root cause (based on observed symptoms): The unpacker is branching on bytes in a scratch buffer that were never written because the decode step didn’t fully populate it. - The first use flagged is in `generic_unpack()`. That function reads from the decompressed/expanded pixel buffer to scatter data into the framebuffer. A “conditional jump depends on uninitialised value(s)” means it’s consulting bytes in that buffer before they were written. - Valgrind says the uninitialised value “was created by a heap allocation (malloc)”, not the stack: this matches a per-tile/per-scanline decode scratch buffer allocated in `exr_decoding_run()`. **Valgrind Trace (top frames):** ```bash ==454== Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) ==454== at 0x4539BE: generic_unpack (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x44B85F: exr_decoding_run (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x38BC5F: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::TileProcess::run_decode(_priv_exr_context_t const*, int, Imf_4_0::FrameBuffer const*, std::__1::vector<Imf_4_0::Slice, std::__1::allocator<Imf_4_0::Slice> > const&) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x388BE1: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::Data::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x388619: Imf_4_0::TiledInputFile::readTiles(int, int, int, int, int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x353755: Imf_4_0::InputFile::Data::bufferedReadPixels(int, int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x352286: Imf_4_0::InputFile::readPixels(int) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x3190FA: Imf_4_0::(anonymous namespace)::readMultiPart(Imf_4_0::MultiPartInputFile&, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== by 0x314C4D: Imf_4_0::checkOpenEXRFile(char const*, unsigned long, bool, bool, bool) (in /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer) ==454== Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation at 0x483B7F3: malloc (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so) ``` ### PoC In the attached archive, you will find: - The executable used for our tests. - The testcase used to trigger the bug. To observe the bug, simply run the OSS-Fuzz helper script: ```bash git clone https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz.git cd oss-fuzz python3 infra/helper.py build_image openexr python3 infra/helper.py build_fuzzers --sanitizer=none openexr python3 infra/helper.py shell openexr apt update && apt install -y valgrind ulimit -n 65535 valgrind --tool=memcheck --track-origins=yes /out/openexr_exrcheck_fuzzer /path/to/poc ``` ### Impact - Undefined Behavior - Potential crash - Denial of Service **Credit:** Aldo Ristori [archive0.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024726/archive0.zip) ### Update Note: Other saved testcases from the fuzzing campaign trigger the same underlying bug, but with a different manifestation. So there is one root cause (missing post-decode validation / zero-init before any unpack), with different call-sites. Below there are several archives, formatted like the previous one, that reproduce the other test cases. **Other observed sinks (distinct manifestations of the same bug):** **Deep pointers path:** generic_unpack_deep_pointers (deep scanline/tiled) [archive1.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024736/archive1.zip) **Deep sample table path:** unpack_sample_table (deep scanline) [archive2.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024740/archive2.zip) **Half conversion path:** half_to_float_buffer_f16c via unpack_half_to_float_3chan_planar [archive3.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024744/archive3.zip) **Deep compositing:** CompositeDeepScanLine::readPixels → ThreadPool::addTask → LineCompositeTask::execute [archive4.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23024746/archive4.zip)

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veröffentlicht 2025-11-10geändert 2026-06-17
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Referenzen (20)

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