CVE-2025-62718

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Cross-Site-Scripting durchzuführen und Daten zu manipulieren.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM License Metric Tool ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Atlassian Bamboo, Bitbucket, Confluence, Fisheye, Crucible, Jira und Jira Service Management ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, erweiterte Berechtigungen zu erlangen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen.

Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking `NO_PROXY` rules. Requests to loopback addresses like `localhost.` (with a trailing dot) or `[::1]` (IPv6 literal) skip `NO_PROXY` matching and go through the configured proxy. This goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if `NO_PROXY` is set up to protect loopback or internal services. According to [RFC 1034 §3.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1) and [RFC 3986 §3.2.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2), a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, `localhost.` is the same as `localhost`. However, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking `NO_PROXY`. This causes requests like `http://localhost.:8080/` and `http://[::1]:8080/` to be incorrectly proxied. This issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections. --- **PoC** ```js import http from "http"; import axios from "axios"; const proxyPort = 5300; http.createServer((req, res) => { console.log("[PROXY] Got:", req.method, req.url, "Host:", req.headers.host); res.writeHead(200, { "Content-Type": "text/plain" }); res.end("proxied"); }).listen(proxyPort, () => console.log("Proxy", proxyPort)); process.env.HTTP_PROXY = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`; process.env.NO_PROXY = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1"; async function test(url) { try { await axios.get(url, { timeout: 2000 }); } catch {} } setTimeout(async () => { console.log("\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/"); await test("http://localhost.:8080/"); // goes through proxy console.log("\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/"); await test("http://[::1]:8080/"); // goes through proxy }, 500); ``` **Expected:** Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback). **Actual:** Proxy logs requests for `localhost.` and `[::1]`. --- **Impact** * Applications that rely on `NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1` for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable. * Attackers controlling request URLs can: * Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy. * Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO\_PROXY rules. * Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy. --- **Affected Versions** * Confirmed on Axios **1.12.2** (latest at time of testing). * affects all versions that rely on Axios’ current `NO_PROXY` evaluation. --- **Remediation** Axios should normalize hostnames before evaluating `NO_PROXY`, including: * Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986). * Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.