CVE-2025-62427

highPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.004 · 37. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.43% (37th) EPSS
CVSS 8.7 · high
Is it mine?
6 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
3 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. The vulnerability is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (@angular/ssr) before 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8. The function createRequestUrl uses the native URL constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., originalUrl or url) begins with a double forward slash (//) or backslash (\\), the URL constructor treats it as a schema-relative URL. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page's virtual location (accessible via DOCUMENT or PlatformLocation tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent relative HTTP requests made during the SSR process (e.g., using HttpClient.get('assets/data.json')) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker's domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint. This vulnerability is fixed in 19.2.18, 20.3.6, and 21.0.0-next.8.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

8.7
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 6.6–8.7

v4.08.7highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v4.08.7highCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · security-advisories@github.com
v4.06.6mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (6)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-q63q-pgmf-mxhrAngular SSR has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw2025-10-16ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact The vulnerability is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** flaw within the URL resolution mechanism of Angular's Server-Side Rendering package (`@angular/ssr`). The function `createRequestUrl` uses the native `URL` constructor. When an incoming request path (e.g., `originalUrl` or `url`) begins with a **double forward slash (`//`) or backslash (`\\`)**, the `URL` constructor treats it as a **schema-relative URL**. This behavior overrides the security-intended base URL (protocol, host, and port) supplied as the second argument, instead resolving the URL against the scheme of the base URL but adopting the attacker-controlled hostname. This allows an attacker to specify an external domain in the URL path, tricking the Angular SSR environment into setting the page's virtual location (accessible via `DOCUMENT` or `PlatformLocation` tokens) to this attacker-controlled domain. Any subsequent **relative HTTP requests** made during the SSR process (e.g., using `HttpClient.get('assets/data.json')`) will be incorrectly resolved against the attacker's domain, forcing the server to communicate with an arbitrary external endpoint. #### Exploit Scenario A request to `http://localhost:4200//attacker-domain.com/some-page` causes Angular to believe the host is attacker-domain.com. A relative request to api/data then becomes a server-side request to `http://attacker-domain.com/api/data`. ### Patches - `@angular/ssr` 19.2.18 - `@angular/ssr` 20.3.6 - `@angular/ssr` 21.0.0-next.8 ## Mitigation The application's internal location must be robustly determined from the incoming request. The fix requires sanitizing or validating the request path to prevent it from being interpreted as a schema-relative URL (i.e., ensuring it does not start with `//`). #### Server-Side Middleware If you can't upgrade to a patched version, implement a **middleware** on the Node.js/Express server that hosts the Angular SSR application to explicitly reject or sanitize requests where the path begins with a double slash (`//`). **Example (Express/Node.js):** ```ts // Place this middleware before the Angular SSR handler app.use((req, res, next) => { if (req.originalUrl?.startsWith('//')) { // Sanitize by forcing a single slash req.originalUrl = req.originalUrl.replace(/^\/\/+/, '/'); req.url = req.url.replace(/^\/\/+/, '/'); } next(); }); ``` ### References - Report: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/issues/31464 - Fix: https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/31474

06

auch bekannt als (3)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2025-10-16geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (8)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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