CVE-2025-59043

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in OpenBao ausnutzen, um Informationen offenzulegen, und um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.

### Summary JSON objects after decoding might use more memory than their serialized version. It is possible to tune a JSON to maximize the factor between serialized memory usage and deserialized memory usage (similar to a zip bomb). While reproducing the issue, we could reach a factor of about 35. This can be used to circumvent the [`max_request_size` (https://openbao.org/docs/configuration/listener/tcp/) configuration parameter, which is meant to protect against Denial of Service attacks, and also makes Denial of Service attacks easier in general, as the attacker needs much less resources. ### Details The request body is parsed into a `map[string]interface{}` https://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/788536bd3e10818a7b4fb00aac6affc23388e5a9/http/logical.go#L50 very early in the request handling chain (before authentication), which means an attacker can send a specifically crafted JSON object and cause an OOM crash. Additionally, for simpler requests with large numbers of strings, the audit subsystem can consume large quantities of CPU. To remediate, set `max_request_json_memory` and `max_request_json_strings`. ### Impact - Unauthenticated Denial of Service ### Resources This issue was disclosed directly to HashiCorp and is the OpenBao equivalent of the following tickets: - https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2025-24-vault-denial-of-service-though-complex-json-payloads/76393 - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6203 HashiCorp attributes the problem to the audit subsystem. For OpenBao, it was noted the problem was additionally in the requests handling logic.

OpenBao is an open source identity-based secrets management system. In OpenBao versions prior to 2.4.1, JSON objects after decoding may use significantly more memory than their serialized version. It is possible to craft a JSON payload to maximize the factor between serialized memory usage and deserialized memory usage, similar to a zip bomb, with factors reaching approximately 35. This can be used to circumvent the max_request_size configuration parameter which is intended to protect against denial of service attacks. The request body is parsed into a map very early in the request handling chain before authentication, which means an unauthenticated attacker can send a specifically crafted JSON object and cause an out-of-memory crash. Additionally, for requests with large numbers of strings, the audit subsystem can consume large quantities of CPU. The vulnerability is fixed in version 2.4.1.

OpenBao has potential Denial of Service vulnerability when processing malicious unauthenticated JSON requests in github.com/openbao/openbao. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/openbao/openbao before v2.4.1.