CVE-2025-29774

Ein entfernter anonymer oder lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in HCL BigFix ausnutzen, um Dateien zu manipulieren, erhöhte Privilegien zu erlangen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand auszulösen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen und beliebigen Code auszuführen.

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM App Connect Enterprise ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Informationen auszuspähen oder seine Privilegien zu eskalieren

# Impact An attacker may be able to exploit this vulnerability to bypass authentication or authorization mechanisms in systems that rely on xml-crypto for verifying signed XML documents. The vulnerability allows an attacker to modify a valid signed XML message in a way that still passes signature verification checks. For example, it could be used to alter critical identity or access control attributes, enabling an attacker with a valid account to escalate privileges or impersonate another user. # Patches All versions <= 6.0.0 are affected. Please upgrade to version 6.0.1. If you are still using v2.x or v3.x please upgrade to the associated patch version. # Indicators of Compromise When logging XML payloads, check for the following indicators. If the payload includes encrypted elements, ensure you analyze the decrypted version for a complete assessment. (If encryption is not used, analyze the original XML document directly). This applies to various XML-based authentication and authorization flows, such as SAML Response payloads. ### Multiple SignedInfo Nodes There should not be more than one SignedInfo node inside a Signature. If you find multiple SignedInfo nodes, it could indicate an attack. ```xml <Signature> <SomeNode> <SignedInfo> <Reference URI="somefakereference"> <DigestValue>forgeddigestvalue</DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo> </SomeNode> <SignedInfo> <Reference URI="realsignedreference"> <DigestValue>realdigestvalue</DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo> </SignedInfo> </Signature> ``` ### Code to test Pass in the decrypted version of the document ```js decryptedDocument = ... // yours to implement // This check is per-Signature node, not per-document const signedInfoNodes = xpath.select(".//*[local-name(.)='SignedInfo']", signatureNode); if (signedInfoNodes.length === 0) { // Not necessarily a compromise, but invalid. Should contain exactly one SignedInfo node // Yours to implement } if (signedInfoNodes.length > 1) { // Compromise detected, yours to implement } ```