CVE-2024-24567

### Summary Vyper compiler allows passing a value in builtin `raw_call` even if the call is a `delegatecall` or a `staticcall`. But in the context of `delegatecall` and `staticcall` the handling of value is not possible due to the semantics of the respective opcodes, and vyper will silently ignore the `value=` argument. A contract search was performed and no vulnerable contracts were found in production. ### Details The IR for `raw_call` is built in the `RawCall` class: https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/blob/9136169468f317a53b4e7448389aa315f90b95ba/vyper/builtins/functions.py#L1100 However, the compiler doesn't validate that if either `delegatecall` or `staticall` are provided as kwargs, that `value` wasn't set. For example, the following compiles without errors: ```python raw_call(self, call_data2, max_outsize=255, is_delegate_call=True, value=msg.value/2) ``` ### Impact If the semantics of the EVM are unknown to the developer, he could suspect that by specifying the `value` kwarg, exactly the given amount will be sent along to the target. However in fact, no `value` will be sent. Here is an example of an potentially problematic implementation of multicall utilizing the `raw_call` built-in: ```python value_accumulator: uint256 = empty(uint256) results: DynArray[Result, max_value(uint8)] = [] return_data: Bytes[max_value(uint8)] = b"" success: bool = empty(bool) for batch in data: msg_value: uint256 = batch.value value_accumulator = unsafe_add(value_accumulator, msg_value) if (batch.allow_failure == False): return_data = raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True) success = True results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data})) else: success, return_data = \ raw_call(self, batch.call_data, max_outsize=255, value=msg_value, is_delegate_call=True, revert_on_failure=False) results.append(Result({success: success, return_data: return_data})) assert msg.value == value_accumulator, "Multicall: value mismatch" return results ``` ### Patches Fixed in https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/pull/3755 ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_

Vyper is a pythonic Smart Contract Language for the ethereum virtual machine. Vyper compiler allows passing a value in builtin raw_call even if the call is a delegatecall or a staticcall. But in the context of delegatecall and staticcall the handling of value is not possible due to the semantics of the respective opcodes, and vyper will silently ignore the value= argument. If the semantics of the EVM are unknown to the developer, he could suspect that by specifying the `value` kwarg, exactly the given amount will be sent along to the target. This vulnerability affects 0.3.10 and earlier versions.