CVE-2023-46814

Ein Hersteller-Fix ist verfügbar.

• BehobenAbility Camera Connectabb_psirt

  The problem is corrected in the following product versions: ABB Ability Camera Connect 1.5.0.15 The 3rd party component has already been updated. The easiest path to mitigate the problem is an update of just VLC Media Player by the customer. ABB recommends that customers apply the update at earliest convenience. It is also possible to update to the latest Version of Camera Connect.

• BehobenAbility Camera Connectcisa_csaf_ot

  The problem is corrected in the following product versions: ABB Ability Camera Connect 1.5.0.15 The 3rd party component has already been updated. The easiest path to mitigate the problem is an update of just VLC Media Player by the customer. ABB recommends that customers apply the update at earliest convenience. It is also possible to update to the latest Version of Camera Connect.

• MitigationAbility Camera Connectabb_psirt

  Given that the VLC-based component is installed exclusively within air-gapped environments under strict administrative control, the following factors substantially reduce risk: • Restricted user access: Only trusted, privileged users perform installations and modifications. Standard users have no write permissions to the uninstaller directory. • No internet or network access: The exploit requires local manipulation of VLC’s uninstaller files; without external connectivity, remote coercion or manipulation is impossible. • Elimination of attacker vector: In air gapped deployments with administrative controls, un-privileged users cannot place malicious DLLs or executables in the uninstaller’s search path. • Minimized privilege escalation risk: The combination of controlled write access, absence of network exposure, and trusted user roles effectively neutralizes the binary hijacking threat, rendering successful exploitation highly unlikely.

• MitigationAbility Camera Connectcisa_csaf_ot

  Given that the VLC-based component is installed exclusively within air-gapped environments under strict administrative control, the following factors substantially reduce risk: • Restricted user access: Only trusted, privileged users perform installations and modifications. Standard users have no write permissions to the uninstaller directory. • No internet or network access: The exploit requires local manipulation of VLC’s uninstaller files; without external connectivity, remote coercion or manipulation is impossible. • Elimination of attacker vector: In air gapped deployments with administrative controls, un-privileged users cannot place malicious DLLs or executables in the uninstaller’s search path. • Minimized privilege escalation risk: The combination of controlled write access, absence of network exposure, and trusted user roles effectively neutralizes the binary hijacking threat, rendering successful exploitation highly unlikely.