CVE-2023-46141

criticalPriorität · verfolgen · 0EPSS 0.009 · 59. PerzentilDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP2 · Scheduled
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.88% (59th) EPSS
CVSS 9.8 · critical
Is it mine?
78 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
4 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · phoenix_contact_psirt

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource vulnerability in multiple products of the PHOENIX CONTACT classic line allow an remote unauthenticated attacker to gain full access of the affected device.

01

Behebungen

Hersteller-Fix, Mitigation oder Workaround, wie von den Quellen veröffentlicht.

Noch kein Hersteller-Fix; eine Mitigation ist verfügbar.

  • Mitigationphoenix_contact_psirt

    Phoenix Contact classic line controllers are developed and designed for use in closed industrial networks. In this approach, the production plant is protected against attacks, especially from the outside, by a multi-level perimeter, including firewalls, and by dividing the plant into OT zones using firewalls. This concept is supported by organizational measures in the production facility as part of a security management system. To achieve security here, measures are required at all levels. It must be ensured that logic is always transferred or stored in protected environments. It applies to both data in transmission and data at rest. Connections between the engineering tools (Automation Worx Software Suite) and the controller must always be in a locally protected environment or, in the case of remote access, protected by VPN. Project data should not be sent as a file via email or other transmission mechanisms without additional integrity and authenticity checks. Project data should only be stored in protected environments. Customers using Phoenix Contact classic line controllers are recommended to operate the devices as intended in closed networks or protected with a suitable firewall. For general information and recommendations on security measures to protect network-enabled devices, refer to the application note: Application note Security external link If a classic line controller can't be used in protected zones, the OT communication protocols should be disabled. Depending on the controller type, this can be done either via CPU services via console or web-based management. Information on which controllers and from which firmware version onwards communication protocols can be deactivated is described in the application note for classic line controllers or in the manual for the respective controller, which is available for download on the Phoenix Contact website. A summary of measures to protect devices based on classic control technology is provided here: Measures to protect devices based on classic control technology

02

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

9.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.19.8criticalAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.19.8criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.19.8criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · info@cert.vde.comAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.19.8criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · Phoenix Contact PSIRT DE
v3.19criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (78)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • VDE-2023-055Phoenix Contact: Automation Worx and classic line controllers prone to Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource2023-12-12csaf · phoenix_contact_psirtDE

    Phoenix Contact classic line industrial controllers are developed and designed for the use in closed industrial networks. The controllers don't feature a function to check integrity and authenticity of the application (e.g.: logic files, executable logic, configurations). Logic files generated by Automation Worx could be manipulated on the engineering station and loaded into the PLC without tamper detection. In addition, the tampering can be done by specially designed attacks in such a way that it remains hidden, and the logic program modifies its own code, making it difficult to determine the impact of a malicious program.

06

auch bekannt als (5)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

veröffentlicht 2023-12-14geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (5)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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