CVE-2023-41329

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 26EPSS 0.006 · 50. PerzentilEURUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.63% (50th) EPSS
CVSS 6.6 · medium
Is it mine?
26 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. This issue has been addressed in version 2.35.1 of wiremock-jre8 and wiremock-jre8-standalone, version 3.0.3 of wiremock and wiremock-standalone, version 2.6.1 of the python version of wiremock, and versions 2.35.1-1 and 3.0.3-1 of the wiremock/wiremock Docker container. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should either configure firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations or to configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

6.6
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–medium · 3.9–6.6

v3.16.6mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 0.7 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.16.6mediumAV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.13.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.13.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 0.5 · Auswirkung 3.4
v3.13.9lowCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · OSV
v3.16.1mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (26)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

20 von 26 angezeigt
05

Advisories (3)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-pmxq-pj47-j8j4Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio webhooks, proxy and recorder modes2023-09-08ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in [Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses](https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses). These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. ### Affected versions - WireMock 3,x until 3.0.3 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - WireMock 2.x until 2.35.1 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - Python WireMock until 2.6.1 - WireMock Studio - all versions, this proprietary product was discontinued in 2022 ### Patches - WireMock 3.0.3 + the 3.0.3-1 Docker image - WireMock 2.35.1 + the 2.35.1-1 Docker image - backport to WireMock 2.x - Python WireMock 2.6.1 ### Workarounds For WireMock: - Option 1: Configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names in the outbound URLs subject to DNS rebinding - Option 2: Use external firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations For WireMock Studio: N/A. Switch to another distribution, there will be no fix provided. The vendor of former WireMock Studio recommends migration to [WireMock Cloud](https://www.wiremock.io/product) ### References - CVE-2023-41327 - Related issue in the WireMock Webhooks Extension

  • BIT-wiremock-2023-41329Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio2026-04-13vendor · osvUS

    WireMock is a tool for mocking HTTP services. The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses. These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. This issue has been addressed in versions 2.35.1-1 and 3.0.3-1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should either configure firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations or to configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names.

  • PYSEC-2026-2050Domain restrictions bypass via DNS Rebinding in WireMock and WireMock Studio webhooks, proxy and recorder modes2026-07-07vendor · osvUS

    ### Impact The proxy mode of WireMock, can be protected by the network restrictions configuration, as documented in [Preventing proxying to and recording from specific target addresses](https://wiremock.org/docs/configuration/#preventing-proxying-to-and-recording-from-specific-target-addresses). These restrictions can be configured using the domain names, and in such a case the configuration is vulnerable to the DNS rebinding attacks. A similar patch was applied in WireMock 3.0.0-beta-15 for the WireMock Webhook Extensions. The root cause of the attack is a defect in the logic which allows for a race condition triggered by a DNS server whose address expires in between the initial validation and the outbound network request that might go to a domain that was supposed to be prohibited. Control over a DNS service is required to exploit this attack, so it has high execution complexity and limited impact. ### Affected versions - WireMock 3,x until 3.0.3 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - WireMock 2.x until 2.35.1 (security patch), on default settings in environments with access to the network - Python WireMock until 2.6.1 - WireMock Studio - all versions, this proprietary product was discontinued in 2022 ### Patches - WireMock 3.0.3 + the 3.0.3-1 Docker image - WireMock 2.35.1 + the 2.35.1-1 Docker image - backport to WireMock 2.x - Python WireMock 2.6.1 ### Workarounds For WireMock: - Option 1: Configure WireMock to use IP addresses instead of the domain names in the outbound URLs subject to DNS rebinding - Option 2: Use external firewall rules to define the list of permitted destinations For WireMock Studio: N/A. Switch to another distribution, there will be no fix provided. The vendor of former WireMock Studio recommends migration to [WireMock Cloud](https://www.wiremock.io/product) ### References - CVE-2023-41327 - Related issue in the WireMock Webhooks Extension

06

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07

quellen

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veröffentlicht 2023-09-06geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (7)

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