CVE-2023-22809

highPriorität · beachten · 60EPSS 0.554 · 99. PerzentilExploit · waffenfähigCHDEEURUUS
grimoire priorityP1 · Urgent
Exploitable?
Public exploit
14 exploits · waffenfähig
Likely / severe?
55.4% (99th) EPSS
CVSS 7.8 · high
Is it mine?
45 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
6 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · abb_psirt

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-24

In Sudo before 1.9.12p2, the sudoedit (aka -e) feature mishandles extra arguments passed in the user-provided environment variables (SUDO_EDITOR, VISUAL, and EDITOR), allowing a local attacker to append arbitrary entries to the list of files to process. This can lead to privilege escalation. Affected versions are 1.8.0 through 1.9.12.p1. The problem exists because a user-specified editor may contain a "--" argument that defeats a protection mechanism, e.g., an EDITOR='vim -- /path/to/extra/file' value.

01

Behebungen

Hersteller-Fix, Mitigation oder Workaround, wie von den Quellen veröffentlicht.

Noch kein Hersteller-Fix; eine Mitigation ist verfügbar.

  • MitigationARM600abb_psirt

    Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).

  • MitigationSWabb_psirt

    Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).

  • MitigationARM600cisa_csaf_ot

    Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).

  • MitigationSWcisa_csaf_ot

    Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).

02

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

7.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen

v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 1.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:W/RC:Csecondary · CISA US
v3.17.3highAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Lsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HsecondaryAusnutzbarkeit 1.8 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Hsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
v3.17.8highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:W/RC:Csecondary · ABB PSIRT
03

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
04

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

05

Exploits (14)

Öffentlicher Proof-of-Concept- und Exploit-Code.

06

betroffene Produkte (45)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

07

Advisories (12)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • 2NGA002579ABB Arctic communication solution ARM600 Vulnerabilities2025-04-07csaf · abb_psirtCH

    ABB is aware of public reports of a vulnerabilities in product versions listed as affected in this advisory. An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could cause the product to stop, make the product inacces-sible, take remote control of the product or insert and run arbitrary code. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to end-of-life, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document, such as using a private APN cellular network between Arctic wireless gateways and ARM600 for establishing VPN tunnels, to mitigate security risks and avoid potential vulnerabilities. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to Limited state, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document to mitigate security risks.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-0151sudo: Schwachstelle ermöglicht PrivilegieneskalationDeutsch2023-01-18csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein lokaler Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in sudo ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erhöhen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-0266genua genucenter: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten AngriffDeutsch2023-02-02csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in genua genucenter ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-0809IBM QRadar SIEM: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-03-30csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM QRadar SIEM ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, Informationen offenzulegen, Informationen falsch darzustellen, einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen, Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, einen Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriff durchzuführen oder unbekannte Auswirkungen zu verursachen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-1251Apple macOS: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-05-18csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Apple macOS ausnutzen, um Administratorrechte zu erlangen, beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, seine Privilegien zu erweitern, Informationen offenzulegen, Dateien zu manipulieren, einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen oder Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-1348IBM Security Guardium: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-06-01csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in IBM Security Guardium ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Benutzersitzungen zu übernehmen und um seine Privilegien zu erweitern.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-1424Xerox FreeFlow Print Server für Solaris: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-06-12csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Xerox FreeFlow Print Server ausnutzen, um die Vertraulichkeit, Verfügbarkeit und Integrität des Systems zu gefährden.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-1542Red Hat OpenShift: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-06-22csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat OpenShift ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen, Informationen offenzulegen, Dateien zu manipulieren oder Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.

  • WID-SEC-W-2023-1812Oracle Communications: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-07-18csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein entfernter, anonymer oder authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Oracle Communications ausnutzen, um die Vertraulichkeit, Integrität und Verfügbarkeit zu gefährden.

  • WID-SEC-W-2024-0064Juniper Produkte: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2024-01-10csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer aus dem angrenzenden Netzwerk oder ein entfernter, anonymer, authentisierter, lokaler oder physischer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Juniper JUNOS, Juniper JUNOS Evolved, Juniper SRX Series, Juniper EX Series, Juniper QFX Series, Juniper ACX Series, Juniper PTX Series und Juniper MX Series ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen und seine Berechtigungen zu erweitern.

  • WID-SEC-W-2024-0794Dell ECS: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2024-04-04csaf · cert_bundDE

    Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Dell ECS ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erweitern, beliebigen Programmcode mit Administratorrechten auszuführen, Informationen offenzulegen, Dateien zu manipulieren, einen Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriff durchzuführen, Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen oder einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen.

  • ICSA-25-105-08ABB M2M Gateway2025-04-07icsa · cisa_csaf_otUS

    ABB is aware of public reports of a vulnerabilities in product versions listed as affected in this advisory. An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could cause the product to stop, make the product inacces-sible, take remote control of the product or insert and run arbitrary code. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to end-of-life, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document, such as using a private APN cellular network between Arctic wireless gateways and ARM600 for establishing VPN tunnels, to mitigate security risks and avoid potential vulnerabilities. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to Limited state, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document to mitigate security risks.

08

auch bekannt als (4)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

09

quellen

Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.

11

Referenzen (53)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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