CVE-2022-51011

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 17EPSS 0.005 · 39. PerzentilUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
0.45% (39th) EPSS
CVSS 4.3 · medium
Is it mine?
1 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
1 sources
osv

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

PocketMine-MP before 4.2.10 fails to validate the total length of incoming chat message blobs before splitting them by newline characters, allowing attackers to send large messages containing many newlines. Malicious clients can send megabyte-sized chat packets and bombard the server with thousands of such messages, causing server lockups lasting seconds or minutes.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

5.3
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–medium · 1.3–5.3

v3.14.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Lprimary · disclosure@vulncheck.comAusnutzbarkeit 2.8 · Auswirkung 1.4
v3.15.3mediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:Lsecondary · OSV
v4.05.3mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · disclosure@vulncheck.com
v4.01.3lowCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Xsecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (1)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-gj94-v4p9-w672Denial-of-service vulnerability processing large chat messages containing many newlines2022-05-25ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact PocketMine-MP caps maximum chat message length at 512 Unicode characters, or about 2048 bytes. No more than 2 chat messages may be sent per tick. However, due to legacy reasons, incoming chat message blobs are split by `\n`, and each part is treated as a separate message, the length of each part is individually checked. The length of the whole message is not checked. This leads to an exploitable performance issue, in which a malicious client may send a chat packet of several megabytes containing nothing but `\n` newline characters. The server will parse this into a very large array and spend a long time (several milliseconds) iterating over it for no reason. Furthermore, due to the lack of sufficient rate limit checks before parsing messages, malicious clients may bombard the server with many thousands of these malicious messages, causing lockups for a significant amount of time (seconds or minutes). ### Patches This bug was addressed in https://github.com/pmmp/PocketMine-MP/commit/df33e179e5d3ff13b56a2d7060bf592b0f797258 by: - checking the length of the incoming message as a whole before parsing it - it may not be larger than `messageCounter * maxChatMessageSize` (`messageCounter` is decremented once for every message sent) - limiting the maximum number of times a message may be split on newlines before giving up and discarding the message (maximum 3 parts; anything after the first 2 parts is discarded) ### Workarounds Handle `DataPacketReceiveEvent` and check for these excessive newlines in incoming `TextPacket`. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Email us at [team@pmmp.io](mailto:team@pmmp.io)

06

quellen

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veröffentlicht 2026-09-07geändert 2026-10-08
07

Referenzen (3) nvd

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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