CVE-2022-40674
highPriorität · verfolgen · 33EPSS 0.022 · 83. PerzentilCHDEEURUUSEPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27
libexpat before 2.4.9 has a use-after-free in the doContent function in xmlparse.c.
Behebungen
Hersteller-Fix, Mitigation oder Workaround, wie von den Quellen veröffentlicht.
Ein Hersteller-Fix ist verfügbar.
- BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AB0)siemens_psirt
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AC0)siemens_psirt
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AB0)siemens_psirt
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AC0)siemens_psirt
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6AG1518-4AX00-4AC0)siemens_psirt
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSCALANCE XCM332 (6GK5332-0GA01-2AC2)siemens_psirt
Update to V2.2 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109817513/ - BehobenSINEC NMSsiemens_psirt
Update to V1.0.3.1 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109818269/ - BehobenPROFINET SDKphoenix_contact_psirt
Update configuration tool chains to libexpat library version 2.4.9. Upgrade to PROFINET SDK 6.7 .
- Behobenphoenix_contact_psirt
Update to the latest 2023.0.0 LTS Firmware Release. PHOENIX CONTACT recommends to always use an up-to-date version of the PLCnext Engineer.
- BehobenSCALANCE XCM332 (6GK5332-0GA01-2AC2)cisa_csaf_ot
Update to V2.2 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109817513/ - BehobenSINEC NMScisa_csaf_ot
Update to V1.0.3.1 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109818269/ - BehobenAFF660/665cisa_csaf_ot
AFF660/665: Apply mitigation strategy as described in General Mitigation Factors Section or update to upcoming release.
- BehobenAFR67xcisa_csaf_ot
AFS670/675, AFR67x: Apply mitigation strategy as described in General Mitigation Factors Section or update to 9.1.08.
- BehobenAFS65Xcisa_csaf_ot
AFS65x: EoL product - only mitigation available, no remediation expected. Apply mitigation strategy as described in General Mitigation Factors Section.
- BehobenAFS660/665Ccisa_csaf_ot
AFS660/665S, AFS660/665C, AFS670v2: Apply mitigation strategy as described in General Mitigation Factors Section or update to upcoming 7.1.08 when available.
- BehobenAFS660/665Scisa_csaf_ot
AFS660/665S, AFS660/665C, AFS670v2: Apply mitigation strategy as described in General Mitigation Factors Section or update to upcoming 7.1.08 when available.
- BehobenAFS670/675cisa_csaf_ot
AFS670/675, AFR67x: Apply mitigation strategy as described in General Mitigation Factors Section or update to 9.1.08.
- BehobenAFS670v2cisa_csaf_ot
AFS660/665S, AFS660/665C, AFS670v2: Apply mitigation strategy as described in General Mitigation Factors Section or update to upcoming 7.1.08 when available.
- BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AB0)cisa_csaf_ot
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AC0)cisa_csaf_ot
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AB0)cisa_csaf_ot
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AC0)cisa_csaf_ot
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - BehobenSIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6AG1518-4AX00-4AC0)cisa_csaf_ot
Update to V3.1.5 or later version
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/ww/en/view/109478459/ - MitigationARM600abb_psirt
Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).
- MitigationSWabb_psirt
Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).
- MitigationPROFINET SDKphoenix_contact_psirt
We strongly recommend customers to ensure that only data from reliable sources is used. Affected customers should also check if vulnerable libexpat library versions are used in the specific configuration tool chain. For detailed information on our recommendations for measures to protect network-capable devices, please refer to our application note: Measures to protect network-capable devices with Ethernet connection
- Mitigationphoenix_contact_psirt
Phoenix Contact recommends operating network-capable devices in closed networks or protected with a suitable firewall. For detailed information on our recommendations for measures to protect network-capable devices, please refer to our application note: Measures to protect network-capable devices with Ethernet connection
- MitigationSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AB0)cisa_csaf_ot
Only build and run applications from trusted sources.
- MitigationSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AC0)cisa_csaf_ot
Only build and run applications from trusted sources.
- MitigationSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AB0)cisa_csaf_ot
Only build and run applications from trusted sources.
- MitigationSIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AC0)cisa_csaf_ot
Only build and run applications from trusted sources.
- MitigationSIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6AG1518-4AX00-4AC0)cisa_csaf_ot
Only build and run applications from trusted sources.
- MitigationARM600cisa_csaf_ot
Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).
- MitigationSWcisa_csaf_ot
Mitigating factors describe conditions and circumstances that make an attack that exploits the vulnerability difficult or less likely to succeed. The following mitigations are recommended. 1. Obtain a cellular private access point (APN). A dedicated private cellular access point and respective SIM card subscriptions can be requested from your cellular service provider. This service doesn’t expose the traffic between remote sites and main site to the internet but rather uses cellular operator’s private wide area network (WAN). Therefore, the ARM600 wouldn’t need open ports to the internet. 2. Avoid exposing any system component to the internet. If, however, the ARM600 is exposed to the internet, only the VPN port should be opened towards the internet (e.g., Patrol management connections can be configured to use VPN tunnel and remote administration connections can be implemented by using OpenVPN PC-client). 4. Perform firewall configuration by the "allowlisting" principle, i.e., explicitly allowing only the required ports and protocols and blocking any other traffic. 6. If the internet is used as a WAN media for carrying VPN tunnels, use Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for terminating connections from the internet (i.e., the remote connections should terminate to the DMZ network, which would be segregated from other networks by a firewall. The ARM600 server would be located into this DMZ). 7. Change the default user credentials of ARM600 and Arctic wireless gateways into non-defaults and use complex non-guessable passwords with special characters. Do not reuse passwords within the system. 8. Use administrator (i.e., root user) privileges only when required by the task. 9. Supporting systems, such as PCs used for configuration, should be frequently updated. If possible, use dedicated site PCs for upgrading and engineering purposes. At minimum, PCs should be investigated by running a full virus scan with recently updated signature files before introducing the PC to the OT system. Any data, such as device configurations and firmware update files transferred to the Arctic system should be virus scanned prior to transferring. 10. Introduce a backup policy, which will ensure periodical backups and backup revision numbering. Consider the following: a. Check that the entire system has backups available from all applicable parts. b. Store the backups in a safe place (e.g. in an encrypted storage), restricted by role-based access control mechanisms. c. Ensure the security of the configuration PCs that may have local copies of device configurations. d. Validate the backups to make sure that they’re working. 11. Follow cyber security best practices for installation, operation, and decommissioning as described in the product’s Cyber Security Deployment Guideline and User Manual. 12. Use continuous monitoring (e.g., intrusion detection/prevention tools) to detect anomalies in the system 13. Consider hardening the system according to the following: a. Remove any unnecessary communication links in the system. b. If possible, close unused physical ports. c. Open only the necessary TCP/UDP ports in the configuration. d. Remove all unnecessary user accounts. e. Restrict traffic by firewall. f. Allow the traffic only from/to necessary hosts' IP addresses (i.e., define both source and destination in the firewall rules, where possible). g. Define client IP address as allowed address in SCADA communication protocols, if such configuration is supported. h. Remove or deactivate all unused processes, communication ports and services, where possible. i. Use physical access controls to the system installations (e.g., to server rooms and device cabinets).
cvss
Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.
Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · high–critical · 7.4–9.8
SSVC
Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.
schwächen
Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.
betroffene Produkte (98)
Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.
- IBM InfoSphere Information Serveralle Versionencert_bundDEcpe:/a:ibm:infosphere_information_server:-
- Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AB0)≤ vers:intdot/>=3.1.0|<3.1.5cisa_csaf_otUS
- Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4AX00-1AC0)≤ vers:intdot/>=3.1.0|<3.1.5cisa_csaf_otUS
- Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AB0)≤ vers:intdot/>=3.1.0|<3.1.5cisa_csaf_otUS
- Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP (6ES7518-4FX00-1AC0)≤ vers:intdot/>=3.1.0|<3.1.5cisa_csaf_otUS
- Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP (6AG1518-4AX00-4AC0)≤ vers:intdot/>=3.1.0|<3.1.5cisa_csaf_otUS
Advisories (18)
Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.
- 2NGA002579ABB Arctic communication solution ARM600 Vulnerabilities2025-04-07csaf · abb_psirtCH
ABB is aware of public reports of a vulnerabilities in product versions listed as affected in this advisory. An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could cause the product to stop, make the product inacces-sible, take remote control of the product or insert and run arbitrary code. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to end-of-life, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document, such as using a private APN cellular network between Arctic wireless gateways and ARM600 for establishing VPN tunnels, to mitigate security risks and avoid potential vulnerabilities. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to Limited state, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document to mitigate security risks.
- SSA-398330SSA-398330: Vulnerabilities in the additional GNU/Linux subsystem of the SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP >= V3.1.0 and < V3.1.52023-12-12csaf · siemens_psirtDE
Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in the additional GNU/Linux subsystem of the firmware version >= V3.1.0 and < V3.1.5 for the SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP (incl. SIPLUS variant). These GNU/Linux vulnerabilities have been externally identified. Siemens has released new versions for the affected products and recommends to update to the latest versions. SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP >= V3.1.0 and < V3.1.5 are no longer maintained and there won't be any update to the CVE list anymore. Please update to the latest version. Note: This SSA advises vulnerabilities for firmware version V3.1 only; for versions < V3.1 refer to Siemens Security Bulletin SSB-439005 (https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssb-439005.html).
- SSA-558014SSA-558014: Third-Party Component Vulnerabilities in SCALANCE XCM332 before V2.22023-04-11csaf · siemens_psirtDE
Multiple vulnerabilities in the third-party components cURL, BusyBox, libtirpc, Expat as well as in the Linux Kernel could allow an attacker to impact the SCALANCE XCM332 device's confidentiality, integrity and availability. Siemens has released an update for the SCALANCE XCM332 and recommends to update to the latest version.
- SSA-892048SSA-892048: Third-Party Component Vulnerabilities in SINEC NMS before V1.0.3.12023-05-09csaf · siemens_psirtDE
Multiple vulnerabilities affecting third-party components libexpat and libcurl of SINEC NMS before V1.0.3.1 could allow an attacker to impact SINEC NMS confidentiality, integrity and availability. Siemens has released an update for SINEC NMS and recommends to update to the latest version.
- VDE-2022-058PHOENIX CONTACT: Profinet SDK libexpat vulnerabilities2022-12-13csaf · phoenix_contact_psirtDE
Two vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Expat XML parser library (aka libexpat). This open-source component is widely used in a lot of products worldwide. An attacker could cause a program to crash, use unexpected values or execute code by exploiting these use-after-free vulnerabilities. Profinet SDK is using XML parser library Expat as reference solution for loading the XML based Profinet network configuration files (IPPNIO or TIC).
- VDE-2023-001PHOENIX CONTACT: Multiple Vulnerabilities in PLCnext Firmware2023-02-14csaf · phoenix_contact_psirtDE
A new LTS Firmware release fixes known vulnerabilities in used open-source libraries. In addition, the following improvements have been implemented: HMI - Hardening against DoS attacks. - Hardening against memory leak problems in case of network attacks. WBM - Umlauts in the password of the 'User Manager' were not handled correctly. The password rule for upper and lower case was not followed. This could lead to unintentionally weaker passwords.- Hardening of WBM against Cross-Site-Scripting. User Manager - In security notifications 'SecurityToken' was always displayed as '0000000' when creating or modifying users.- Hardening of Trust and Identity Stores.
- WID-SEC-W-2022-1504expat: Schwachstelle ermöglicht CodeausführungDeutsch2022-09-22csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann eine Schwachstelle in expat ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen und einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen
- WID-SEC-W-2022-2055Mozilla Firefox und Thunderbird: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2022-11-15csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Mozilla Firefox, Mozilla Firefox ESR und Mozilla Thunderbird ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, einen Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriff durchzuführen und Informationen falsch darzustellen.
- WID-SEC-W-2022-2372genua genugate: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2022-12-19csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann einige der mehreren Schwachstellen in Komponenten von Drittanbietern ausnutzen, die von genua genugate verwendet werden, um Informationen offenzulegen und potentiell weitere, unbekannte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.
- WID-SEC-W-2023-0561Xerox FreeFlow Print Server: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-03-02csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Xerox FreeFlow Print Server ausnutzen, um die Vertraulichkeit, Verfügbarkeit und Integrität des Systems zu gefährden.
- WID-SEC-W-2023-1728Autodesk AutoCAD: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2023-07-11csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Autodesk AutoCAD ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen, Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Dateien zu manipulieren oder Informationen offenzulegen.
- WID-SEC-W-2024-0794Dell ECS: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2024-04-04csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Dell ECS ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erweitern, beliebigen Programmcode mit Administratorrechten auszuführen, Informationen offenzulegen, Dateien zu manipulieren, einen Cross-Site-Scripting-Angriff durchzuführen, Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen oder einen Denial of Service Zustand herbeizuführen.
- WID-SEC-W-2024-1591Juniper JUNOS: Mehrere SchwachstellenDeutsch2024-07-10csaf · cert_bundDE
Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Juniper JUNOS ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service zu verursachen, Informationen offenzulegen, Privilegien zu erweitern und Sicherheitsmechanismen inklusive zu umgehen.
- ICSA-23-103-09Siemens SCALANCE XCM3322023-04-11icsa · cisa_csaf_otUS
Multiple vulnerabilities in the third-party components cURL, BusyBox, libtirpc, Expat as well as in the Linux Kernel could allow an attacker to impact the SCALANCE XCM332 device's confidentiality, integrity and availability. Siemens has released an update for the SCALANCE XCM332 and recommends to update to the latest version.
- ICSA-23-131-05Siemens SINEC NMS Third-Party2023-05-09icsa · cisa_csaf_otUS
Multiple vulnerabilities affecting third-party components libexpat and libcurl of SINEC NMS before V1.0.3.1 could allow an attacker to impact SINEC NMS confidentiality, integrity and availability. Siemens has released an update for SINEC NMS and recommends to update to the latest version.
- ICSA-23-143-01Hitachi Energy’s AFS65x, AFS67x, AFR67x and AFF66x Products2023-05-31icsa · cisa_csaf_otUS
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to disclose sensitive information or lead to a Denial-of-Service (DoS).
- ICSA-23-348-10Siemens SIMATIC S7-15002023-12-12icsa · cisa_csaf_otUS
Multiple vulnerabilities have been identified in the additional GNU/Linux subsystem of the firmware version >= V3.1.0 and < V3.1.5 for the SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518(F)-4 PN/DP MFP (incl. SIPLUS variant). These GNU/Linux vulnerabilities have been externally identified. Siemens has released new versions for the affected products and recommends to update to the latest versions. Note: This SSA advises vulnerabilities for firmware version V3.1 only; for versions < V3.1 refer to Siemens Security Bulletin SSB-439005 ( https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssb-439005.html).
- ICSA-25-105-08ABB M2M Gateway2025-04-07icsa · cisa_csaf_otUS
ABB is aware of public reports of a vulnerabilities in product versions listed as affected in this advisory. An attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could cause the product to stop, make the product inacces-sible, take remote control of the product or insert and run arbitrary code. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to end-of-life, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document, such as using a private APN cellular network between Arctic wireless gateways and ARM600 for establishing VPN tunnels, to mitigate security risks and avoid potential vulnerabilities. As part of ABB product lifecycle policy, once a product transitions to Limited state, we discontinue maintenance, security patches, and technical support to focus on current and future technologies. While the product will continue to function, we strongly recommend implementing mitigations defined in this document to mitigate security risks.
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Referenzen (73)
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
- https://cxsecurity.com/cveshow/CVE-2022-40674/cnnvd
- https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/a976e32abd257728a51dc55cf3d4ebee5b853459Patchcnnvd
- https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/629cnnvd
- https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/640cnnvd
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/09/msg00029.htmlcnnvd
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GSVZN3IJ6OCPSJL7AEX3ZHSHAHFOGESK/cnnvd
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/J2IGJNHFV53PYST7VQV3T4NHVYAMXA36/cnnvd
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/LQB6FJAM5YQ35SF5B2MN25Y2FX56EOEZ/cnnvd
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