CVE-2022-29247

mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 39EPSS 0.010 · 64. PerzentilEURUUS
grimoire priorityP3 · Track
Exploitable?
—
no known exploitation
Likely / severe?
1.05% (64th) EPSS
CVSS 6.8 · medium
Is it mine?
18 products
Prüfe deine Angriffsfläche
Who says so?
5 sources
cnnvd · enisa_euvd · fstec_bdu · nvd

EPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript (JS), HTML, and CSS. A vulnerability in versions prior to 18.0.0-beta.6, 17.2.0, 16.2.6, and 15.5.5 allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` enabled which in turn allows effective access to `ipcRenderer`. The `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` option does not implicitly grant Node.js access. Rather, it depends on the existing sandbox setting. If an application is sandboxed, then `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs, which include `ipcRenderer`. If the application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC `senderFrame` validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to `ipcRenderer` can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled. Electron versions 18.0.0-beta.6, 17.2.0, 16.2.6, and 15.5.5 contain a fix for this issue. As a workaround, ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate `senderFrame`.

01

cvss

Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.

9.8
010

Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · low–critical · 2.2–9.8

v2.06.8mediumAV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:Pprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 8.6 · Auswirkung 6.4
v3.19.8criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hprimary · NVD / NIST USAusnutzbarkeit 3.9 · Auswirkung 5.9
v3.19.8criticalAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsecondary · FSTEC (BDU) RU
v3.12.2lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · ENISA EU
v3.12.2lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · security-advisories@github.comAusnutzbarkeit 0.7 · Auswirkung 1.4
v3.12.2lowCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:Nsecondary · OSV
v3.19criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:Usecondary · CVSS-BT (t0sche)
02

SSVC

Eine Handlungsentscheidung — aus Ausnutzung und Auswirkung.

Trackcoordinatorcisa_ssvcUS
03

schwächen

Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.

04

betroffene Produkte (18)

Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.

05

Advisories (1)

Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.

  • GHSA-mq8j-3h7h-p8g7Compromised child renderer processes could obtain IPC access without nodeIntegrationInSubFrames being enabled2022-06-16ghsa · osvUS

    ### Impact This vulnerability allows a renderer with JS execution to obtain access to a new renderer process with `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` enabled which in turn allows effective access to `ipcRenderer`. Please note the misleadingly named `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` option does not implicitly grant Node.js access rather it depends on the existing `sandbox` setting. If your application is sandboxed then `nodeIntegrationInSubFrames` just gives access to the sandboxed renderer APIs (which includes `ipcRenderer`). If your application then additionally exposes IPC messages without IPC `senderFrame` validation that perform privileged actions or return confidential data this access to `ipcRenderer` can in turn compromise your application / user even with the sandbox enabled. ### Patches This has been patched and the following Electron versions contain the fix: * `18.0.0-beta.6` * `17.2.0` * `16.2.6` * `15.5.5` ### Workarounds Ensure that all IPC message handlers appropriately validate `senderFrame` as per our [security tutorial here](https://github.com/electron/electron/blob/main/docs/tutorial/security.md#17-validate-the-sender-of-all-ipc-messages). ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org).

06

auch bekannt als (4)

Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.

07

quellen

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veröffentlicht 2022-06-13geändert 2026-06-17
08

Referenzen (4)

Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.

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