CVE-2019-6477
mediumPriorität · verfolgen · 31EPSS 0.041 · 91. PerzentilEURUUSEPSS · bewertet 2026-10-27
With pipelining enabled each incoming query on a TCP connection requires a similar resource allocation to a query received via UDP or via TCP without pipelining enabled. A client using a TCP-pipelined connection to a server could consume more resources than the server has been provisioned to handle. When a TCP connection with a large number of pipelined queries is closed, the load on the server releasing these multiple resources can cause it to become unresponsive, even for queries that can be answered authoritatively or from cache. (This is most likely to be perceived as an intermittent server problem).
Behebungen
Hersteller-Fix, Mitigation oder Workaround, wie von den Quellen veröffentlicht.
Ein Hersteller-Fix ist verfügbar.
- Behobenbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-license-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Behobenpython3-bind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 After installing the update, the BIND daemon (named) will be restarted automatically.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2020:1845 - Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-debugsource-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-export-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-libs-lite-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-license-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-lite-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-devel-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-libs-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-pkcs11-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-chroot-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-sdb-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundbind-utils-debuginfo-32:9.11.13-3.el8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
- Workaroundpython3-bind-32:9.11.13-3.el8.noarch as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 8)redhat_csaf
The vulnerability can be mitigated by disabling server TCP-pipelining: ~~~ keep-response-order { any; }; ~~~ and then restarting BIND. The server restart is necessary because neither a 'reload' nor a 'reconfig' operation will properly reset currently pipelining TCP clients. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining. Note: This mitigation will only work with bind-9.11 and above.
cvss
Technischer Schweregrad, 0–10. Eine Zeile je Quelle.
Basiswert 0–10 · höher = schwerwiegender · Vektor überfahren zum Auflösen⚠ Quellen uneinig · medium–high · 5–7.5
schwächen
Die CWE-Schwächeklassen, zu denen dies gehört.
betroffene Produkte (195)
Betroffene Produkte und Versionsbereiche.
- ISC BIND9≤ 9.11.6-P1 -> 9.11.12, 9.12.4-P1 -> 9.12.4-P2, 9.14.1 -> 9.14.7, and versions 9.11.5-S6 -> 9.11.12-S1 of BIND 9 Supported Preview Edition. Versions 9.15.0 -> 9.15.5 of the BIND 9.15 development branch are also affectedenisa_euvdEU
Advisories (1)
Hersteller- und Ökosystem-Meldungen dazu.
- RHSA-2020:1845Red Hat Security Advisory: bind security, bug fix, and enhancement update2020-04-28csaf · redhat_csafUS
An update for bind is now available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8. Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Moderate. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.
auch bekannt als (4)
Weitere Namen und Kennungen dieser Entität.
quellen
Welche Quellen diesen Datensatz belegen und wann.
Referenzen (45)
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
- http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-10/msg00041.htmlcnnvd
- http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-10/msg00044.htmlcnnvd
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2019-6477cnnvd
- https://kb.isc.org/docs/cve-2019-6477cnnvd
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/L3DEMNZMKR57VQJCG5ZN55ZGTQRL2TFQ/cnnvd
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/XGURMGQHX45KR4QDRCSUQHODUFOGNGAN/cnnvd
- https://lists.isc.org/pipermail/bind-announce/2019-November/001142.htmlcnnvd
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-6477cnnvd
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