Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 Product Security and Bug Fix Update
An update is now available for Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 Red Hat Product Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Important. A Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVE link(s) in the References section.
beschreibt (1)
Zugehörige CVEs.
| ID | Schweregrad | ausnutzbar | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-1801US | — | — | ||
A flaw was found in the Ansible aap-gateway. Concurrent requests handled by the gateway grpc service can result in concurrency issues due to race condition requests against the pro… | ||||
Referenzen
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
Behebungen (16)
- Behobenautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Behobenautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Behobenautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Behobenautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Behobenautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Behobenautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Behobenautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Behobenautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:1954 - Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
- Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
- Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
- Workaroundautomation-gateway-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.src as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
- Workaroundautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
- Workaroundautomation-gateway-config-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
- Workaroundautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el8ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
- Workaroundautomation-gateway-server-0:2.5.20250305-1.el9ap.noarch as a component of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9
Follow the mitigation steps to avoid the flaw from happening. It is recommended to update the product after the fix is available. 1) set GRPC_SERVER_MAX_THREADS_PER_PROCESS = 1 This mitigates problems going FORWARD for the issue because there is only one thread using the ExternalAuth() object instantiated by the parent process. This eliminates the thread safety risk as the worker only processes one request at a time. 2) It is possible that at any time since the install/upgrade of AAP 2.5, that long lived Oauth tokens created in the components with the endpoints could implicate long term access to a different user's identity/privileges. Requests made with these tokens will appear to be from the user for which they were created and are indistinguishable from “valid” tokens that were created by the correct user: /api/controller/v2/tokens/ /api/controller/v2/applications/<id>/tokens/ /api/galaxy/v3/auth/token/ /api/controller/o/token/ Because it is likely not feasible to back trace every request that could have generated a token to its original request in the GRPC server, the most conservative and safe path to mitigate this risk would be to invalidate/revoke all existing oauth tokens in the components (hub, controller, eda).
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