Plug: quadratic-time decoding of nested query/body parameters enables denial of service
### Summary Plug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request. ### Details For a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth. The same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The decoder shows ~4× scaling per 2× input (16k levels ≈ 195 ms on a single scheduler). ### PoC 1. POST `a[a][a]...[a]=1` as `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` to any endpoint of a Plug-based app. Even at the 1 MB urlencoded-parser default the payload carries ~333,000 nesting levels; with the broader `Plug.Parsers` body limit (20 MB default) a single request can carry millions. 2. Launch one such request per scheduler concurrently. Each pins a scheduler for minutes; legitimate traffic stalls once all schedulers are busy. ### Impact A single low-bandwidth sender can render any internet-reachable Plug-based service (most Phoenix and standalone Elixir/Erlang web stacks) unresponsive. No credentials, specific endpoint, or prior knowledge of the application is required. ### References * Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/712b875d3442c765d8d37e546ffd5ad9f8afcc55 * Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/b4aa8a0665ce2726a6d5af44467fb4f59595b107
beschreibt (1)
Zugehörige CVEs.
| ID | Schweregrad | ausnutzbar | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-54892US | — | — | ||
Inefficient algorithmic complexity in Plug's nested-parameter decoder allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4 (and Plug.Conn.… | ||||
Referenzen
Externe Belege — Patches, Meldungen, Analysen.
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-54892.htmlWEB
- https://github.com/elixir-plug/plugPACKAGE
- https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/blob/v1.19.3/CHANGELOG.md#v1193-2026-06-23WEB
- https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/9c5d37c440eaae92869eed7c014c47266744fadbWEB
- https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/a61124aa625d819a218fb07f90afbac8aa85eb0eWEB
- https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/c317d08fdcf96e17931f7419275b2b8c4bf3e951WEB
- https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/d4e5568392a4b29e545b91e12e87d6098f976145WEB
- https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/d737eb236f17e31a36290e39f9ef3cd86a1343bdWEB
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