GHSA-575r-357h-fhch

Snipe-IT vulnerable to cross-company asset maintenance re-parenting via API update

### Impact The API endpoint for updating asset maintenance records allows an authorized user to change the asset_id of an existing maintenance record to an asset outside their company scope. In a Full Multiple Company Support / multi-company deployment, this allows a user from Company A to attach or move a maintenance record onto an asset belonging to Company B. The endpoint appears to authorize access to the existing maintenance record’s asset, but does not re-authorize the newly supplied asset_id before saving the update. ### Affected endpoint `PATCH /api/v1/maintenances/{maintenance_id}` Also likely affected: `PUT /api/v1/maintenances/{maintenance_id}` ### Preconditions The attacker needs: - A valid authenticated API token. - Permission to update asset maintenance records. - Access to a maintenance record currently attached to an asset in their own company. The attacker does not need access to the target asset’s company. ### Root cause In the API maintenance update flow, the application checks access to the current maintenance record / current asset, then accepts attacker-controlled fields including `asset_id`. The vulnerable behavior is that the new asset_id is not checked against the current user’s company scope before being saved. ### Relevant code path: `app/Http/Controllers/Api/MaintenancesController.php` The update method loads the maintenance, checks access to the existing $maintenance->asset, then calls: ```php $maintenance->fill($request->all()); $maintenance->save(); ``` Since `asset_id` is fillable on the maintenance model, the attacker can re-parent the record to another company’s asset. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ ### Security impact This breaks tenant/company isolation in multi-company deployments. A scoped user can write maintenance records against assets outside their authorized company boundary. Potential impact includes: - Cross-company asset history pollution. - Unauthorized modification of another company’s asset maintenance timeline. - Incorrect maintenance, cost, audit, and warranty records on victim-company assets. - Loss of integrity in asset lifecycle records. This is not intended functionality because the application’s company-scoping model should prevent users from writing records onto inaccessible assets.