GHSA-8x9c-rmqh-456c

Twig: Sandbox `__toString()` policy bypass via `Traversable` in `join` and `replace` filters

### Description This is a residual bypass of CVE-2026-47732 / GHSA-pr2w-4gpj-cpq4 left after the initial fix for unguarded `__toString()` calls. It covers two related coercion points that were not caught by the original patch. **`Traversable` in `join` and `replace` filters.** `SandboxExtension::ensureToStringAllowed()` recurses into PHP arrays so that a `Stringable` object hidden inside an array argument cannot be string-coerced without consulting the security policy. The recursion stops at PHP arrays: a `Traversable` value passed at the same position is not materialised, so its contents are not policy-checked. `CoreExtension::join()` and `CoreExtension::replace()` later materialise such `Traversable` inputs through `self::toArray()` and feed them to `implode()` / `strtr()`, both of which implicitly call `__toString()` on contained `Stringable` objects. The bypass also reproduces when the container implements both `Stringable` and `Traversable`: the container's own `__toString()` is policy-checked, but the elements yielded by `getIterator()` are not, and the consuming filters still coerce them to string. **`in` and `not in` operators.** `InBinary` and `NotInBinary` compile to `CoreExtension::inFilter()`, which falls through to PHP's `<=>` operator when comparing a string with a `Stringable` object. PHP coerces the object to string via `__toString()` without the sandbox policy being consulted. Beyond the direct side effect, `in` can also be used as a content-leak oracle: each probe against an attacker-chosen needle leaks one bit of equality, and chained probes can reconstruct the string returned by `__toString()` even when every method is denied. The bypass reproduces with both array and `Traversable` haystacks, and on both operand sides. A sandboxed template author who is allowed to call `join` / `replace`, or to use the `in` / `not in` operators, can therefore trigger a disallowed `__toString()` method on objects reachable from the render context, even when that method is not on `SecurityPolicy::$allowedMethods`. The bypass reproduces both under global sandbox mode and when sandboxing is enabled through `SourcePolicyInterface`. ### Resolution `SandboxExtension::ensureToStringAllowed()` now also recurses into `Traversable` operands when sandboxing is active for the current source: each value is materialised once and run through the same array-recursion path, so the policy is consulted before the filter implementation can coerce contained objects to strings. This applies to plain `Traversable` operands as well as to containers that implement both `Stringable` and `Traversable`: the container's own `__toString()` is still policy-checked, and the yielded elements are additionally checked. The materialisation is guarded by `isSandboxed($source)` so that non-sandboxed code paths do not pay the cost or change generator-exhaustion semantics. `InBinary` and `NotInBinary` now implement `Twig\Node\CoercesChildrenToStringInterface` and declare both operands as string-coerced, so `SandboxNodeVisitor` wraps each operand in `CheckToStringNode`. The policy is consulted before `CoreExtension::inFilter()` reaches PHP's `<=>` operator, matching the existing protection on the other comparison binaries (`Equal`, `Less`, `Greater`, `Spaceship`, ...). ### Credits Twig would like to thank Vincent55 Yang and Fabien Potencier for reporting the issues and Fabien Potencier for providing the fix.