GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp

NocoBase has SSRF in Workflow HTTP Request and Custom Request Plugins

## Summary NocoBase's workflow HTTP request plugin and custom request action plugin make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs without any SSRF protection. An authenticated user can access internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost. ## Vulnerable Code ### 1. Workflow HTTP Request Plugin **`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-workflow-request/src/server/RequestInstruction.ts` lines 117-128:** ```typescript return axios.request({ url: trim(url), // User-controlled, no validation method, headers, params, timeout, ...(method.toLowerCase() !== 'get' && data != null ? { data: transformer ? await transformer(data) : data } : {}), }); ``` The `url` at line 98 comes directly from user workflow configuration with only whitespace trimming. ### 2. Custom Request Action Plugin **`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/actions/send.ts` lines 172-198:** ```typescript const axiosRequestConfig = { baseURL: ctx.origin, ...options, url: getParsedValue(url, variables), // User-controlled via template headers: { ... }, params: getParsedValue(arrayToObject(params), variables), data: getParsedValue(toJSON(data), variables), }; const res = await axios(axiosRequestConfig); // No IP validation ``` ## Missing Protections - No `request-filtering-agent` or SSRF library (confirmed via grep across entire codebase) - No private IP range filtering - No cloud metadata endpoint blocking - No URL scheme validation - No DNS rebinding protection ## Attack Scenario 1. Authenticated user creates a workflow with HTTP Request node 2. Sets URL to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` 3. Triggers the workflow 4. Server fetches AWS metadata and returns IAM credentials in workflow execution logs Alternatively via Custom Request action: 1. Create custom request with URL `http://127.0.0.1:5432` or `http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin` 2. Execute the action 3. Server makes request to internal service ## Impact - **Cloud metadata theft**: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials via metadata endpoints - **Internal network access**: Scan and interact with services on private IP ranges - **Database access**: Connect to localhost databases (PostgreSQL, Redis, etc.) - **Authentication required**: Yes (authenticated user), but any workspace member can create workflows