GHSA-5xfq-5mr7-426q

OpenClaw's unsanitized session ID enables path traversal in transcript file operations

## Description OpenClaw versions **<= 2026.2.9** construct transcript file paths using an unsanitized `sessionId` and also accept `sessionFile` paths without enforcing that they stay within the agent sessions directory. A crafted `sessionId` and/or `sessionFile` (example: `../../etc/passwd`) can cause path traversal when the gateway performs transcript file read/write operations. **Preconditions:** an attacker must be able to authenticate to the gateway (gateway token/password). By default the gateway binds to `loopback` (local-only); configurations that expose the gateway widen the attack surface. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `<= 2026.2.9` - Fixed: `>= 2026.2.12` ## Fix Fixed by validating session IDs (rejecting path separators / traversal sequences) and enforcing sessions-directory containment for session transcript file operations. ### Fix Commit(s) - `4199f9889f0c307b77096a229b9e085b8d856c26` ### Additional Hardening - `cab0abf52ac91e12ea7a0cf04fff315cf0c94d64` ## Mitigation Upgrade to `openclaw >= 2026.2.12`. Thanks @akhmittra for reporting.