GHSA-9p38-94jf-hgjj

OpenClaw has macOS `system.run` allowlist bypass via quoted command substitution

### Summary In OpenClaw's macOS node-host path, `system.run` allowlist parsing in `security=allowlist` mode failed to reject command substitution tokens when they appeared inside double-quoted shell text. Because of that gap, payloads like `echo "ok $(id)"` could be treated as allowlist hits (first executable token `echo`) while still executing non-allowlisted subcommands through shell substitution. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: npm `openclaw` - Latest published affected version: `2026.2.21-2` - Affected range: `<= 2026.2.21-2` - Patched version (planned next release): `2026.2.22` Notes: - Default installs are not affected (`security=deny` by default). - The issue requires opting into `security=allowlist` on the macOS node-host path. ### Impact Approval/authorization bypass in allowlist mode that can lead to unintended command execution on the node host. ### Preconditions - Target uses macOS node-host / companion-app execution path. - Exec approvals set to `security=allowlist`. - Ask mode is `on-miss` or `off`. - Allowlist contains a benign executable used in a shell wrapper flow (for example `/bin/echo`). ### Reproduction (example) Use a shell-wrapper command where the visible executable is allowlisted but the quoted payload contains substitution: - command argv: `/bin/sh -lc 'echo "ok $(/usr/bin/id > /tmp/openclaw-poc-rce)"'` - allowlist pattern includes `/bin/echo` Before the fix, allowlist analysis could resolve this as allowlisted while shell substitution still executed. ### Remediation - Upgrade to `2026.2.22` (or newer) when released. - Temporary mitigation: set ask mode to `always` or set security mode to `deny`. ### Fix Commit(s) - `90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6` ### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to planned next release `2026.2.22`. After npm release is out, advisory can be published directly. OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.