GHSA-pj5x-38rw-6fph

OpenClaw has a Command Injection via unescaped environment assignments in Windows Scheduled Task script generation

### Summary A command injection vulnerability existed in Windows Scheduled Task script generation for OpenClaw. Environment values were written into `gateway.cmd` using unquoted `set KEY=VALUE`, which allowed Windows shell metacharacters in config-provided environment variables to break out of assignment context. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.17` - Patched version: `>= 2026.2.19` - Latest published vulnerable version at review time (2026-02-19): `2026.2.17` ### Practical Risk Context For a single-user, localhost-only setup on a personally controlled machine, practical risk is typically low. This issue becomes materially relevant when configuration or environment values are sourced from less-trusted inputs, for example: - shared/team config templates, - copied config snippets, - setup scripts, automation, or repos that write config, - any workflow where another party can influence env values before `gateway install`/reinstall. In those scenarios, it provides a reliable config-to-command-execution path when the scheduled task script is generated and run. ### Details On Windows, gateway service installation writes a helper batch script and then registers it via Scheduled Task (`schtasks`). Before the fix, env lines were rendered as `set KEY=VALUE` in `src/daemon/schtasks.ts`, so values containing metacharacters (for example `&`, `|`, `^`, `%`, `!`) could alter command behavior in `cmd.exe`. The fix now renders quoted assignments (`set "KEY=VALUE"`) with explicit escaping for cmd metacharacters, updates parser compatibility for quoted assignments, and adds regression tests for metacharacter handling and round-trip parsing. ### Fix Commit(s) - `dafe52e8cf1a041d898cfb304a485fa05e5f58fb` OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.