RHSA-2020:5199

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

If the CAP_NET_RAW capability disabled by default (which is true for Red Hat Enterprise Linux), then only a privileged user can trigger this bug. The mitigation is to disable CAP_NET_RAW capability for regular users and for executables. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 CAP_NET_RAW capability can be also gained by exploiting unprivileged user namespaces. The mitigation is to disable unprivileged user namespaces by setting user.max_user_namespaces to 0: # echo "user.max_user_namespaces=0" > /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf # sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/userns.conf OpenShift Container Platform 4.5 and 4.4 this can be mitigated by removing `CAP_NET_RAW` from the default cri-o capabilities provided to pods (NOTE: This may prevent `ping` from working in unprivileged pods. This fix has not been validated for OpenShift 4.3 or below): ``` apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1 kind: MachineConfig metadata: labels: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker name: 50-reset-crio-capabilities spec: config: ignition: version: 2.2.0 storage: files: - contents: source: data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,W2NyaW8ucnVudGltZV0KZGVmYXVsdF9jYXBhYmlsaXRpZXMgPSBbCiAgICAiQ0hPV04iLAogICAgIkRBQ19PVkVSUklERSIsCiAgICAiRlNFVElEIiwKICAgICJGT1dORVIiLAogICAgIlNFVEdJRCIsCiAgICAiU0VUVUlEIiwKICAgICJTRVRQQ0FQIiwKICAgICJORVRfQklORF9TRVJWSUNFIiwKICAgICJTWVNfQ0hST09UIiwKICAgICJLSUxMIiwKXQo= filesystem: root mode: 0644 path: /etc/crio/crio.conf.d/reset-crio-capabilities.conf ``` Create this MachineConfig object via e.g. `oc apply`. More information about MachineConfig can be found here: https://github.com/openshift/machine-config-operator https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/architecture/architecture-rhcos.html In order to monitor the rollout of this change, use `oc describe machineconfigpool/worker`. Check for any pods which start to crash after this is applied; they may need to be adjusted request `CAP_NET_RAW` explicitly. More information: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/#set-capabilities-for-a-container https://docs.openshift.com/container-platform/4.5/authentication/managing-security-context-constraints.html

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options don't meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.