launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors
### Summary `launch-editor` forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution. ### Impact #### Direct `launch-editor` users Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) - The first argument of `launchEditor` can start with `+` or `-` or the user is using WSL #### `launch-editor-middleware` users Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) - launch-editor older than v2.2.0 is used, or the user is using WSL #### Vite users Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) - The user is using WSL ### Details `launchEditor(file)` function passes the file name as-is to the editor if the file with that file name exists. If the file name starts with `-` (also `+` for Vim), the editor treats them as flags rather than positional arguments. For example, Vim treats arguments starting with `+` as an Ex command. As a result, an existing relative directory such as: ``` +call writefile(["SAFE_MARKER"],"LAUNCH_EDITOR_MARKER")|qa! ``` is not treated as a filename when passed to Vim. Vim executes the embedded Ex command. The following editor has a potentially destructive operation exposed to the CLI arguments: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs (including Emacsclient) - Notepad++ (only if using a plugin exposing dangerous operations via plugin messages) `launch-editor-middleware` v2.2.0+ converts the passed file path to an absolute path so those are not affected as long as the user is not using WSL. For WSL, `launch-editor` converts the paths to relative paths internally, so those are still affected. Vite 2.0.0+ uses `launch-editor-middleware` v2.2.0+ so the WSL users are only affected.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-112944US | — | — | ||
launch-editor allows users to open files with line numbers in editor from Node.js. Prior to 2.14.2, when an attacker can create a filesystem entry beginning with plus or minus in t… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editorPACKAGE
- https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/commit/f6e6701bb1f16f2dd242b321374f1b6cca6eb6d4WEB
- https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/pull/156WEB
- https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/releases/tag/v2.14.2WEB
- https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxwWEB
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112944ADVISORY
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