Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest
Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.2, registry/client.(*manifests).Get() reads a manifest returned for a digest-pinned request and passes it to distribution.UnmarshalManifest without hashing the body against the requested digest, allowing a malicious or intercepted registry response to substitute attacker-chosen manifest content even when Docker-Content-Digest claims the requested value. The bundled pull-through proxy in registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go can cache and re-serve the substituted manifest. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.2.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-85747US | — | — | ||
Distribution is a toolkit to pack, ship, store, and deliver container content. Prior to 3.1.2, registry/client.(*manifests).Get() reads a manifest returned for a digest-pinned requ… | ||||
references
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