GHSA-wq4w-vwvq-q3x9

Nginx UI: Standalone short tokens survive administrative revocation in cache and authenticate again after account re-enable

### Summary Standalone short tokens issued for WebSocket and explicit-token authentication can survive administrative revocation in cache. If the same account is later re-enabled before the cache entry expires, the deleted short token becomes valid again. ### Details `GenerateShortToken()` creates an `AuthToken` row that contains only `ShortToken` and no long `Token`. `DeleteUserTokens()` removes database rows, but when clearing caches it only invalidates entries where `authToken.Token != ""`. This leaves standalone short-token cache entries behind. `GetTokenUserByShortToken()` checks that cache first and then loads the user by ID, so the stale short token becomes usable again if the account status is restored to `true`. Relevant code paths: - [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:43) - [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:118) - [internal/user/user.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/user/user.go:204) - [api/user/short_token.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/user/short_token.go:13) - [internal/middleware/middleware.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/middleware/middleware.go:82) ### PoC This was verfied locally in an isolated environment with a temporary package-level harness that exercised the real token issuance, revocation, cache, and re-authentication paths. What the executed test did: 1. Created an enabled user in a temporary SQLite database. 2. Called the real `GenerateShortToken(user.ID)` function to issue a standalone short token. 3. Verified that the token authenticated successfully and was present in the short-token cache. 4. Disabled the user and called the real `DeleteUserTokens(user.ID)` function. 5. Verified that the database token rows were removed. 6. Verified that the short-token cache entry still existed after `DeleteUserTokens`. 7. Re-enabled the same user. 8. Reused the previously deleted short token via the real `GetTokenUserByShortToken()` path and observed successful authentication. Observed result from the actual local verification: - The database token rows were removed during revocation. - The short-token cache entry remained present. - Re-enabling the user restored successful authentication through the stale short token. ### Impact Any deployment using standalone short tokens is affected. If a short token is stolen, administrative disable/delete-token handling may not fully revoke it. Re-enabling the account within the cache lifetime restores access for the stale token to any HTTP or WebSocket routes that accept short-token authentication.