vm2: External module allowlist uses a raw prefix test, so a prefix-sharing sibling package is treated as allowlisted
## Summary `isPathAllowedForModule` decides whether a resolved path belongs to an allowlisted external module using a raw string prefix test. `node_modules/foo2` starts with `node_modules/foo`, so a package whose name merely shares a prefix with an allowlisted one is treated as being inside it, and a relative require from the allowlisted package reaches it even with transitive loading disabled. ## Where it is `lib/resolver-compat.js`, lines 122 to 132, quoted from HEAD `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92`: ```js isPathAllowedForModule(path, mod) { if (!super.isPathAllowed(path)) return false; if (mod) { if (mod.allowTransitive) return true; if (path.startsWith(mod.path)) { const rem = path.slice(mod.path.length); if (!/(?:^|[\\/])node_modules(?:$|[\\/])/.test(rem)) return true; } } return this.externals.some(regex => regex.test(path)); } ``` With `mod.path` of `.../node_modules/foo` and a resolved path of `.../node_modules/foo2/index.js`, `startsWith` is true and `rem` is `2/index.js`, which contains no `node_modules` segment, so the function returns true. The `node_modules` test in `rem` is what stops a genuine transitive dependency from slipping through. It does not stop a sibling, because a sibling's remainder never contains that segment. ## Impact Code running in `NodeVM` under an external module allowlist with `transitive: false` can reach a package that was not allowlisted, provided an allowlisted package performs a relative require to a prefix-sharing sibling. Two preconditions are worth stating plainly rather than leaving implicit. The deployment must already have such a package layout, and an allowlisted package must have a reachable code path that does the relative require. This is not something the attacker creates; it is something they find. That narrows it considerably, and it is why I have not scored it higher. ## Reachability `NodeVM.run` at `lib/nodevm.js:506` executes the script. `require` comes from `createRequireForModule` at `lib/setup-node-sandbox.js:168-172` and reaches the resolver callback at `lib/nodevm.js:380-384`. `LegacyResolver.resolveFull` at `lib/resolver-compat.js:145-160` sets `currMod` for direct requires, the relative specifier resolves through `DefaultResolver.resolveFull` and `tryFile` at `lib/resolver.js:327-330`, and the authorization decision lands on the function above. ## Suggested fix Require a separator after the prefix, so a sibling cannot match: ```js if (path === mod.path || path.startsWith(mod.path + path.sep)) { ``` That is the same anchoring the `rem` regex already applies to `node_modules`, applied one level earlier.
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-92945US | —OT elevated | — | ||
vm2 before 3.11.7 contains a module allowlist bypass vulnerability in isPathAllowedForModule that uses raw string prefix matching instead of boundary-anchored comparison. Attackers… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2PACKAGE
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/6ac3916da84e060c403e407b6b6318fcc66b0e72WEB
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.7WEB
- https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-7q3f-wx44-378mWEB
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92945ADVISORY
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-before-3.11.7-module-allowlist-bypass-via-prefix-matchingWEB
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