EEF-CVE-2026-82736

Ash.Type.CiString validates length and match constraints before case folding, allowing constraint bypass

## Summary Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize vulnerability in ash-project ash lets an attacker store a case-insensitive string value that violates its length or match constraints. `Ash.Type.CiString.apply_constraints/2` (`lib/ash/type/ci_string.ex`) validated the `max_length`, `min_length`, and `match` constraints against the value as submitted, while the type case-folds the string (per its `casing`) for storage and comparison. Because validation ran before folding, an attacker can submit a value whose folded form breaks a constraint but whose original form passes: for example, against a match pattern requiring uppercase, an uppercase value that is stored lowercased persists a value the pattern rejects. The fix case-folds the value at the start of `apply_constraints/2`, so the constraints are checked against the form that is actually stored. This issue affects ash: from 1.29.0-rc0 before 3.32.2.