Electron: contextBridge object copy honors prototype setters
### Impact Objects copied across the `contextBridge` boundary from untrusted content could carry an attacker-influenced prototype, enabling prototype-pollution-style attacks against preload code despite context isolation being enabled. Apps are only affected if their preload code accepts object arguments from untrusted content and reads properties from them without own-property checks. Apps that only accept primitive arguments, or that validate object arguments, are not affected. ### Workarounds Validate objects received from untrusted content with own-property checks (`Object.hasOwn`), or copy them onto a null-prototype object before use. ### Fixed Versions * `42.0.0-beta.4` * `41.2.2` * `40.9.2` * `39.8.9` ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email Electron at [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)
describes (1)
Related CVEs.
| ID | severity | exploitable | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-70610US | — | — | ||
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.4, objects copied across th… | ||||
references
External citations — patches, advisories, analysis.
- https://github.com/electron/electronPACKAGE
- https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/17d5d26499cd279fab48f5f26527f8edc02a7713WEB
- https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/23a6efb714dec80e2cf45d3054d18d701162e4ddWEB
- https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/4ac50292d552fb510eb778392620c85308770a55WEB
- https://github.com/electron/electron/commit/5b699544cbbed51bedb7c60d75c8c42be5825737WEB
- https://github.com/electron/electron/pull/51083WEB
- https://github.com/electron/electron/pull/51084WEB
- https://github.com/electron/electron/pull/51085WEB
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